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INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study 
It is proposed in this study first to review certain basic phil­
osophical premises both of traditional and modern systems; second, to 
consider the objectives of counseling: third, to determine which of these 
philosophies is most compatible with the counseling art, and lastly, to 
discuss a method of counseling that could be developed from this analysis. 
In considering this stated purpose there appears one glaring 
omission throughout the literature of counseling: the lack of an emphasis 
on the philosophy that is fundamental to the particular approach taken by any 
of the several adherents of the specific techniques of counseling. True, 
there have been certain exceptions to this generalization: but if one were 
to scrutinize the writings of the many authorities, one would be hard put to 
say that any writer had started from a point of generalization that had firm 
footings in philosophy or that could be clearly delineated as a philosophical 
approach. McGowan and Schmidt have commented on this very item. 
"Considerably less has been written on the issues of philosophy and values 
in counseling than on techniques.. .the development of a basic philosophy is one 
of the more advanced stages of a profession's evolution. " (51) They 
further point out that most professions seem to be subjected to a series of 
evolutionary steps, that at the outset the primary emphasis seems to be on 
the clarification and perfecting of techniques. In succeeding phases. 
2 
emphasis turns to the training and development of new members, and finally 
there is a turning to the derivation of a systematic philosophy and the 
establishment of a code of ethics. 
Counseling, as a formal movement, began a little over fifty years 
ago. From its first feeble steps in 1910 with Frank Parsons in Boston, it 
has pushed its scope out to encompass almost the entire spectrum of 
behavior and its manifestations as well as the modification of this behavior. 
During the course of this development it has been influenced by many 
movements and directions, this stress came from sources based in philosophy, 
in psychology or science, and each of these emphases have exerted some 
pressure in the direction that the course of counseling took. These pressures 
have brought about the formulation of a code of ethics, the establishment 
of an objective or objectives for the counseling situation and even established 
standards of qualifications for practitioners, but the development of a basic 
philosophy seems to have been neglected. 
Unquestionably there is a trend toward an increased emphasis on 
the philosophies that underlie the counseling art; Carl Rogers' recent writings 
are an indication, as is Wrenn's comment ".. .it is of utmost importance that 
knowledge of man's behavior be seen in the framework of the meaning of his 
existence in the universe. " (81) This is not to imply that, in their thinking, 
philosophy did not act as an underlying factor, but rather to propose that in 
so far as a stated philosophy is concerned one is very prone to notice that 
it is frequently non-evident. 
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We can note specific reference to the psychological technique 
or approach that was assumed to be basic, or to a quasi philosophic 
principle from which a system could be developed and on which frame a 
definitive or particular technique could be built. But is this adequate? Is 
it enough to say that a system which deals with essential notions, concepts, 
and ideals can be based on a thought process that is other than primary? 
If we consider the counseling art as restricted to adjustment only 
or limited in some other dimension, this might be taken as enough! Yet we 
are constrained to ask the question. "Is this the scope, the intent, the 
objective of counseling?" There seems to be a sufficient body of evidence 
to say that such a view is restrictive. 
To begin with, we should look to the object of counseling. It is not 
the composite of empirical data, nor is it the specific as deduced from some 
universal; it is rather the subjective "me", the individual. Not the "me" 
looked at in the cold light of science, but the subjective individual as a 
sum total of abilities, talents, social assets and liabilities, emotional 
strengths and weaknesses, values, wishes and aspirations. This should 
be immediately discernible when we read the statement of the Committee on 
Definition, Division of Counseling Psychology of American Psychological 
Association, (as regards the objective of counseling.) ". ..the development 
of an individual's inner life through concern with his motivation and emotions... " 
We must likewise note the ethical and moral issues in each counseling 
encounter: how these can be divorced from their philosophic base is difficult 
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to conceive ! 
Some philosophies of the past have tended to be related to 
religion, but it does not follow that such a tie is essential, in fact the 
philosophical narrowness of some counselors might be closely related 
to their concept of religion as a set of dogmas telling man what to do. 
Arbuckle makes this point quite clear in his statement "., .man moved 
into the study of the psychological and philosophical nature of man, 
with very little in the way of knowledge about the former and a general 
bias and suspicion toward the latter." (4) 
If, however, we accept the idea that philosophy has a place in 
this art; if we further look on it as something which makes a man think 
about the basic foundations of his outlook, his knowledge, his beliefs 
and as that which inclines him to inquire into the reasons for what he 
accepts and does, and into the importance of his ideas and ideals in the 
hope that these ideas, when examined, will be validly held, then 
philosophy will have purpose and should be a prime concern when 
counseling is considered. 
It will therefore be the intent of this paper to look at this art and 
to consider the implications that philosophy has when it is considered 
first, per se, and then in its application. Yet to say, "the implications of 
philosophy as related to counseling," is tantamount to saying that the total 
of recorded history will be related to single events in this field of study! 
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Such an objective iSj at the stage of learning in this day and age, an 
undertaking that exceeds human ability and, if attempted, could only be 
the effort of a committee of some magnitude or a person not willing to face 
reality. This problem is in need of greater definition; the philosophy then 
that will be evaluated in this study is that of the existentialists, since it 
was previously noted that this would be an appropriate philosophy on which 
to develop a counseling psychology and methodology. (82) 
Having proposed this particular philosophy as the area for exploration 
there exist certain propositions that must be considered; these are to be 
found in the problems of knowledge, of being and of self in the world as they 
exist in the traditional philosophies and as treated in the existential 
philosophy. These must be studied as a prerequisite to any detailed analysis. 
The Status of Existentialism 
Since, in recent years, existentialism has come to the fore as a 
controversial philosophy it is necessary to look to these points if we are to 
first be able to make a stand. Brie sack has stated the current and popular 
notion of it when he says, ".. .it is regarded as some form of Parisian 
pornography or .teutonic brooding." But such a statement, as he aptly 
pointed out, looks only at the superficialities and the outward manifestations, 
and these for the most part as noted in the observation of those individuals 
who have been the proponents of the major thoughts in the matter. To take 
such observations as the basis for accepting or rejecting a proposition would 
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be less than sensible y and although this might be a cause for questioning 
and investigation, it should not be taken as critical. 
A position that must be looked into as one that created a slight 
difficulty is the statement made by Kneller, "Existentialism is not to be 
considered a systematic philosophy in the traditional sense; rather, it 
permeates philosophies, it is an act of philosophizing." (40) If we admit 
to the fact that no single author has completely systematized this doctrine 
in a formal structure of knowledge, if we also allow that it does not conform 
to the standards of traditional systems as exemplified by Aristotle, Kant 
and the other greats, then this comment has validity. Yet it appears that 
we must return to a basic definition of philosophy. The presentation of a 
formal definition offers some difficulty, but the comment of Will Durant 
seems to have merit, "every science begins as philosophy ends as art; it 
arises in hypothesis and flows into achievement. Philosophy is a hypo­
thetical interpretation of the unknown (as in metaphysics), or the inexactly 
known (as in ethics or political history); it is the front trench in the seige 
of truth. " (21) We might also consider the definition presented by Weigel 
and Madden: "Philosophy is the thought discipline which proceeds from the 
real considered in terms of meanings, achieved spontaneously by the mind in 
the search of the real, to the rational erection of a hierarchical system of 
principles derived from the meaning achieved, in order to give the ultimate 
understanding of reality in so far as it is assiminable by the natural human 
mind. " (77) And of course in the context of this paper that comment made 
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by Bertrand Russell provides this answer in at least a negative manner; 
"Philosophy, if it cannot answer as many questions as we would wish, has 
at least the power of asking questions which increase the interest of the 
world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface 
even in the commonest things of daily life. " (65) We can also notice a 
difference of emphasis between philosophies and even between groups of 
philosophers; this is evident from the first beginnings to the most modern; 
from Plato to Aristotle, as individual philosophers; from certain of the 
British with their emphasis on the utilitarian aspects, to those of the German 
philosophers with their insistence on method. 
But whatever the precise relationship that may exist between this 
and other forms of knowledge, between individual philosophies or between 
groups of philosophers, there is in most cases a general agreement on the 
types of problems with which philosophy is centrally concerned. They are 
most often related to those which raise the question of the meaning of 
human life and of the significance of the world in which man finds himself. 
It is, in most cases, concerned with the nature of the universe in which 
life has its setting and how this affects human destiny! What is this destiny? 
How can man affect this destiny by his actions? What actions and pursuits 
should be elected and what kind of life is most worthwhile? 
If we study existentialism in the light of these considerations it 
would indeed be difficult to designate it as anything but a system of 
philosophy! The application of these ideas to the existential philosophy 
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would seem to set aside the contention that " .. .many philosophers regard 
the existentialists as having abdicated the philosophers quest, as having 
turned their back on a rational examination of man's world." (57) In fact 
as R. Shinn remarks, "they are interested in the person who has met some 
shock that makes him ask, 'What am I doing anyhow?'" (70) 
It is well to note here an historical comment, ".. .la philosophie sem­
blait condamnée â'une r&le secondaire. Elle a retrouvé aujourd'hui son 
prestige. Dans un monde que ni la relition ne satisfont pleinement, elle 
se croit de nouvenu, qualifier pour fournier une réponse aux interrogations 
humaines. Elle ne s'exprime pas seulement dans les traitas des specialists: 
la literature, l'art subissent'également son influence." (41) 
This philosophy has not restricted itself to the method and notions 
of the past. It has broken with the past to provide answers to human 
questions. Mr. La cour-Ga yet continues his comment to indicate that the 
philosophy that has so drastically reacted to the human condition and 
which has permitted itself such diverse expression is none other than 
existentialism. It is not considered in this excerpt as an aspect of a 
system; there is no hesitation in giving it recognition, and no reservations 
placed in according this philosophy status beyond that which might be 
implied in Kneller's comment! 
Yet this notion has been all too frequently used and must be looked 
at in some greater length than as outlined here. The matter will be 
looked at with some degree of thoroughness in this paper. 
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Need for the study 
As might be deduced from the comment on the dearth of material that 
has been written on philosophical issues in counseling, there is need for 
greater, more extensive work in this area; Wrenn's superlative ".. .the utmost 
importance..lends additional stress to this position. But once more there 
must be definition of the problem! Although it is not the contention of this 
paper that one specific philosophy is alone appropriate for counseling it will 
be an objective to demonstrate that the philosophy that stems from existential 
thinking could be basic for the development of the counseling art. 
To this end it should also be noted that distinctions must be made in 
the terminology used, and perhaps the most important distinction may be 
found in the term 'counseling' itself. The art of counseling is frequently 
looked at as a generic whole and as encompassing all aspects of an inter­
personal relationship. Such a broad connotation can lead to some problems 
in understanding and in this paper the term must have more critical definition. 
An indiscriminate application of the term could cause misunderstanding and 
lead one to place restrictions on the implications of the underlying philosophies. 
For this purpose then the term 'counseling' must be differentiated from 
'guidance' as well as from 'psychotherapy. ' The differences in these procedures 
can be noted, and thus if the word 'counseling' were applied without restriction, 
there would be an obvious and unwarranted invasion of objectives. 
"Counseling," as Leona Tyler says, "is one of those words that 
everybody understands but no two people seem to understand in precisely the 
same way. " (76) This is true in the ranks of the professionals and among 
the nonprofessionals. The three operations, guidance, counseling, and 
psychotherapy must be distinguished at this point in order to lend clarity. 
The first is "guidance;" as a term, this is not meant to indicate the "guidance 
services" or the "guidance process" which are all inclusive as Smith noted; 
"The guidance process consists of a group of service to individuals to 
assist them in securing the knowledges and skills needed in making adequate 
choices, plans and interpretations essential to satisfactory adjustment in a 
variety of areas. These services are designed to result in efficiency in areas 
which require that the individual make adjustments in order that he may be an 
effective member of society." (51) Such a term is too ail inclusive and would 
encompass not only guidance, but counseling and referral to psychotherapy 
as well. The term 'guidance,' as used in this paper, is intended to denote 
those activities that help an individual form a decision, make a choice, or 
find a direction at some important fork in the road, such as planning a life 
career, a program in college, or a campaign to obtain employment. 
Counseling has deeper implications, it is_a helping process the aim 
of which is not to change the person but to enable him to use the resources 
he now has to cope with life, the outcome of which would be that the client 
do something, take some constructive action in his own behalf. Whether the 
need that brings him to counseling grows out of his arrival at a point in life 
where an important decision must be made, or out of an emotional conflict 
that is paralyzing his ability to act, the counselor will attempt to make 
forward movement possible. (76) 
Arbuckle gives its broad objective as the helping of the individual 
to clean away the entangling and hampering tentacles so that he can be 
what he really is, and contribute more both to himself and to his fellows. 
This distinction is clearly defined by Loughary in this statement; ".. .the 
most important function and the greatest potential contribution of a school 
counselor is counseling per se ... while counseling guidance procedures 
make valuable contributions of their own, they should all facilitate 
counseling efforts." (47) 
A final point to be clarified is the concept of 'therapy." The aim of 
therapy is generally considered to be personality change of some sort. It 
was pointed out by several authors that perhaps the very difference that 
exists between 'counseling' and 'therapy' is the objective, and this has 
been noted as perhaps the "depth" of the encounter. Therapy has been 
regarded variously by several authors; Lecky for example said, ".. .the 
pursuit of uncounscious complexes with no stated goal except to destroy 
them suggests a moral crusade against the Neurosis." Rogers, on the other 
hand, says that the outcome of therapy is "a more broadly based structure 
of self, .. .and a more comfortable and realistic adjustment to life. " (61) 
But regardless of what position we take it is possible to note that there is a 
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difference, and whether we note it as a difference in depth, objective or 
method, we must recognize it! Therefore this paper will take cognizance 
of this problem and in its approach will deal primarily with that aspect 
referred to as "counseling. " This is not to imply that the approaches, 
techniques or applications of each are separate and distinct, but rather to 
note that this is a special field and one to which the main emphasis will be 
directed. Harry Bone in an introduction to Rollo May's book "The Art of 
Counseling" expressed this point with a very apt comparison; "if one is 
physically ill one needs a medical doctor; if one is ill with an illness in 
personality maladjustment that arises from both physical and mental causes 
one needs a psychiatrist; if one suffers from personality problems which 
are psychological a consulting psychologist is indicated; in so far as one is 
immature and uneducated one needs schooling; the field of counseling lies 
between these last two and the counselor shares part of the equipment of 
each." (50) 
With this point established, it is possible to note two facts; one, 
the reason for counseling and two, the main emphases of the existential 
thinking in the radical stress on the concept of identity and the experience 
of identity that it posits as a sine qua non of human nature and of any 
philosophy of human nature. 
In counseling we are forced to note the one underlying emphasis and 
that is the attempt to work with the client to a greater self realization, and 
the achievement of an effective relationship with his environment, or, as 
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summarized by the committee on definition, "to contribute to the realistic 
acceptance of one's own capacities, motivations and self attitudes," There 
is a distinct relationship then existing between this art and the identity 
emphasis that one finds in the existential thinking. 
. Yet we must look beyond this specific aspect for additional 
justification for this paper; first as has been pointed out because there is 
a very obvious paucity of material developed on the underlying philosophies 
of counselingf and second, because of the many recognized philosophical 
principles that relate to counseling. Cribbin (19) listed these in detail in 
his critique of the philosophy of modern guidance and are summarized in the 
following listings: 
1. The recognition of the worth and dignity of the individual 
and his right to personal assistance in time of need, 
2. The individual has a right to develop his whole person 
with the fullest realization of his potentialities for 
individual and social ends. 
3. The right of every person to accept or reject help and 
services offered must be respected. 
4. Counseling has a responsibility to society as well as 
to the individual. 
5. A comprehensive study of the individual in his cultural 
setting by available means is demanded. Individual 
understanding must precede individual assistance. 
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6. Counseling is to be entrusted only to those who are 
naturally endowed for the task or have the proper training 
and experience. 
But these principles return to the basic notion of man and the reason 
for his being, as well as to a comprehensive and all encompassing definition 
of 'counseling' in all of its facets. These principles are recognized and are 
accepted; yet, as was noted above the most obvious omission in the writing 
of the many specialists has been in the area dealing with these philosophic 
principles as they relate to counseling. 
Developing from these considerations is a last point which will show 
the need for this specific aspect of the study, i.e., existentialism as a 
philosophy in counseling. The first consideration is that this philosophy is 
relatively new, when compared to the greater systems. It is also a widely 
misunderstood philosophy, but it has put into modern day thought ideas of 
certain human values which the classical philosophical and religious 
traditions tended to revoke. We will note in the work of the existentialists 
a study of the value systems whose source is in the acute awareness of the 
tragedy inherent in the human condition; their function is to liberate us from 
the fears and frustrations of every day life or the tedium of philosophical 
daydreaming, and their common characteristic is intensity. (53) Such 
considerations in the field of philosophy seems to ignore the first order 
questions that metaphysics used to ask, such as the nature of being. 
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causation, and free will, but they do ask these questions; their "man-
centered approach," however, appears to make them indifferent to 
systematic thinking. Their emphasis on man the decision-making creature, 
blessed, or cursed, with the freedom to choose among a variety of poss­
ibilities in an absurd and mysterious existence is certainly one that should 
be explored in the light of the concept noted as fundamental to the 
philosophy of counseling. It is to this end that this paper will be oriented, 
to explore with considerable depth this relationship in order to determine if 
the philosophy of existentialism is compatible with a philosophy of 
counseling. If such a comparison is valid, and if this relationship can be 
noted, then such a study would be profitable since it would be a further 
addition to the total of knowledge in the area of philosophy and of counseling. 
Method to be followed 
In approaching this subject it is necessary to keep in mind this 
dual objective: first the implications of philosophy, and second the 
application of philosophy to counseling. Because of this two fold consider­
ation, the commonness of the material to be covered, and distinctive aspects 
of the underlying philosophy must be noted. To meet this need the study 
will be made through an evaluation of the problems of knowledge, of being, 
and of self in the world. This organization was chosen because of its 
direct ties with philosophy and because of its implications in counseling. 
Thus in the method to be followed for each of these specific facets will be to; 
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(1) study them in their philosophic setting^  (2) note the particular emphasis 
of the separate philosophies on the subject, and (3) evaluate this stress 
in relation to the counseling process. Finally this effort will look at these 
problems in the light of existential thought and see if any consistency of 
principle or thinking can be noted or developed. 
Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is an attempt to discover 
the means by which our knowledge is acquired, the extent of our knowledge 
and the standards or criteria by which we can reliably judge the truth or 
falsity of our knowledge. The popular usages of 'knowledge' are hardly 
what is in question here; knowledge must find out what we really "know," 
this is sharply distinguished from the notion of opinion which may or may not 
be true. It is the quest of true knowledge that gives rise to the problem of 
knowledge and which will, in this instance, be considered in the light of 
the existential philosophy, to determine if this latter system is valid. 
However, it will not be an objective or attempt of this study to develop a 
theory of knowledge, since, as Bertrand Russell has pointed out, no one 
has succeeded in developing a theory that is both credible and consistent. 
Some of the more believable theories appear to contain grave inconsistencies 
and some of the most logical theories appear to be unbelievable. Rather, 
the aim will be to note those theories that have the greatest acceptance and 
to examine their applicability to counseling, to see if they are compatible to 
the existential philosophy, and how this philosophy complements or adds to 
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them in their approach to the human predicament. 
The problem of being is so closely tied to the existential philosophy 
and is so much a part of many of the other systems that it must be studied 
and evaluated. In this aspect the problems of being must be noted in all 
their implications of existence, actuality, reality and historicity, as well as 
in their relation to knowledge. It is also necessary that these problems be 
related to the practice of counseling to develop or deny a relationship; if 
these principles change the notion of how man is to be helped the art of 
counseling will then be involved. 
It will be a final point in this three fold analysis to look at the • 
problem of self in the world. Since the all pervading object of counseling 
is to enable the individual to realize his fullest potential, this aspect of 
the study has a definite and positive application. Still it must be noted 
that if the philosophy of existentialism is to be evaluated in the light of the 
counseling art, these facets must be scrutinized. Therefore, while looking 
at the different thoughts of philosophers on this specific point, the appli­
cation to existential thought will be an undercurrent and this in turn further 
related to the counseling practice. 
With this analysis completed it should be possible to make certain 
inferences as to the acceptability of a philosophy based on existential 
thought to counseling, and once this has been determined, to develop a 
theoretical set of ideas that can be applied to counseling. From this philo­
sophical theory certain hypothesis may be evolved that may enhance or add 
to the further development of the art. It should also be the aim of this 
paper to look at the techniques presently accepted in counseling 
practice and to note whether the counseling methods based in existential 
philosophy could be tenable or would have to be rejected. 
In summary it must be once again noted that if such a method can 
be shown to have merit and application to the art of counseling, then 
it will have added directly to the field of knowledge in this particular 
area. It will also provide new foundations for a greater theoretical 
expansion and in consequence provide more latitude in the development 
of hypothesis that can be proposed in the field of counseling. It will 
perhaps complement the notion of Rogers, ".. .attempt to discover the 
functional process relationships which lived for the inner world of 
personal meanings, and to formulate these with sufficient precision 
that they may be put to empirical test. " (63) 
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THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 
Man tends to be satisfied with what he thinks he knows of the 
universe and in his complaisance he does not stop to ask how this knowledge 
was attained or to question its reliability or validity. On occasion this 
certainty is shaken by a discovery that shows there is some doubt or falsity 
about what we assumed to be beyond doubt. When this happens with any 
consistency we may become suspicious of all claims to certainty. Such 
doubt would perhaps be the start of a philosophical questioning of the pro­
blem of knowledge so that it could possibly lead to a position of certainty. 
In our daily life we often feel that something is a fact; we, however 
abandon or revise our opinion and adopt new positions and to these give 
the same credibility and hold with no less confidence than we did.the 
previous. We notice that this happens not only in the case of individuals 
but also with groups, societies and even nations, yet at each step these 
have been put forth and supported as knowledge. In addition to this 
changing of opinions among many individuals, peoples and groups, we 
are forced also to notice a diversity of opinions and ideas that are 
contradictory! As a result it is mandatory that we look at these ideas and 
opinions, and many aspects of beliefs to determine which constitute 
knowledge. 
But of greater importance to this work is the relationship that can 
be seen to exist between the ideas and art of counseling, this art in its 
dual aspect as seen by the counselor and the counselee. Knowledge 
here is most critical, for we cannot expect the counselor to effectively 
work with a client without an understanding of the intellectual systems 
involved. Blaise Pascal wrote, "one must know oneself. If it does not 
serve to discover truth, it at least serves as a rule of life, and there is 
nothing better. " (55) Ignoring the very dogmatic aspect of this dictum, 
there is at least in this admonition an implication that this will have some 
benefit, and if beneficial it should be considered as a guide post to the 
parties involved in the encounter of the counseling situation. But his knowl­
edge of self is tied in so closely to the philosophical aspects of the 
problem of knowledge that to ignore this latter would be to enter the work 
in an unprepared fashion. It has deeper significance in this instance 
since all features should be considered and the very critical aspects of 
existential philosophy in its relationship to this problem should be noted. 
Principles of knowledge 
'Knowledge' as a term is most comprehensive in scope, it is in a way 
a correlative of being and the only thing which cannot therefore fall in the 
purview of this field would be something that cannot exist in any way except 
negatively, in a word, nothing. Its consideration extends, therefore, to all 
things knowable, to all kinds of knowers, to all modes of knowing and to all 
methods of knowing. Nor must one confuse this idea of knowledge with ig­
norance. This is not a consideration of truth or falsity; it does not consist 
of the truth of a conclusion but of the way the conclusion was reached. 
21 
or is held in the mind. By the same token knowledge is not a consideration 
of adequacy or inadequacy; it is not to be found in the distinctions that 
exist between certainty and opinion. Yet without regard to the approach we 
take to knowledge, we find no doubt that knowledge is good, that its pos­
session contributes to the happiness of men and in the same way to the 
welfare of the state, and that its pursuit by the individual and its dis-
simination in a society should be facilitated by every means and device that 
can assist man in communicating what they know to one another. This last 
point has particular interest in the counseling situation because of the 
recognition that has been given to the verbal and nonverbal aspects of com­
munication and to the recognition that so many things contribute to the 
individual make-up, such as socio-economic and culture influences, personal 
values and the host of other aspects that distinguish one man from another. 
One thing that appears to be certain in a review of the principles of 
knowledge is all the great thinkers who have considered the problem of human 
knowledge have seemed to set some limits on the capacity that man has for 
knowledge. All appear to have placed certain objects beyond man's power 
to apprehend, or have distinguished between those which he can apprehend 
in some limited fashion but which he cannot completely comprehend. They 
have also indicated others that fall completely within his grasp and about 
which his knowledge is adequate and certain. Most philosophers seem to 
have taken a stand which appears to avoid the extreme positions of saying 
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that nothing is unknowable or that everything is equally knowable! Yet 
they all appear to establish different criteria by which they set the limit 
of knowledge and distinguish between the areas of probability and certainty. 
Thus due notice should be given to the point that among these philosophers 
and thinkers there is a difference in how they determine the knowability 
of certain types of objects such as God or the infinite/ substance or cause, 
the real or the idea, the self or the thing in itself. 
We note that all seem to procédé from a desire to be critical. In 
their writings most philosophers seem to criticize what the others have 
proposed as knowledge and then to propose their own method by which they 
assume the pursuit of knowledge will be safeguarded from endless contro­
versy. In this last aspect the moderns have appeared to have departed 
most radically from the ancient and medieval writers. In the earlier phases 
of philosophy the tradition of knowledge about knowledge did not seem to 
be all dominating, nor to take precedence over other inquiries, nor to be a 
prerequisite to this inquiry! The ancient and medieval philosophers seem 
to have presupposed the existence of knowledge. However, beginning with 
Descartes, who proposed a method of universal doubt in order to clear the 
ground before the foundation of science could be laid, the consideration of 
knowing is put before any attempt to know. 
These two different approaches to the theory of knowledge result in 
different conclusions concerning the nature and the scope of human knowledge. 
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Rationalists, who begin with established science and look into their 
foundations and methods, will surely end with a complete confidence in 
man's ability to know. Empiricists, on the other hand, who make the 
inquiry of the foundations of science a necessary preparation for the 
development of science, will most surely set narrower boundaries in the 
area of acceptable knowledge. It follows then that there must be different 
ways in which the kinds of knowledge will be understood and compared. 
Perhaps the most expeditious way to observe these differences 
would be to briefly review the positions held by certain philosophers in 
time, and to endeavor to point out their specific area of emphasis. When 
early man gave thought to the problem of knowledge he reached a conclusion 
that appeared valid for his culture; he believed ideas came to him from the 
world of spirits that surrounded him at all times. The gods were the source 
of good ideas and the demons put evil ideas in his mind. Thoughts came 
from outside himself, from the forces and processes that governed and 
directed every phase of his life. "The steps of man are guided by the Lord. 
But who is the man who can understand his own way." (Pvo. 22-24) 
But philosophy, in explaining knowledge, has continually moved 
away from the supernatural and has tried to explain this phenomenon in 
naturalistic terms as the result of natural processes and as subject to the 
laws of nature . Heraclitus was one of the earliest philosophers to address 
himself to his problem. His interest was centered on nature, on the world 
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in which men lived, and his desire was to explain how it came to be and 
what it was. He felt that reason was a more certain source of knowledge 
than was sense perception. Reason was a spark of the divine in man, and 
this allowed him to see truth in ways not given to man devoid of reason. 
To explain this in a manner that would be consistent with the notion that 
man is a rational animal, he held that most men lived not by reason but by 
passion. Democritus also held that sense experience was a source of 
obscure knowledge; he contended that we really know when we transcend 
sense perception, at this point we are in a realm that deals with things 
that can not be shown by the senses and are therefore in the realm of true 
knowledge. 
The interest of these early philosophers seemed to point primarily 
to the problems of the nature of substance, they recognized that man's 
ability to have ideas and to know the world about him presented a problem. 
Their solutions all seemed to revolve around the concept that ideas and the 
material world must be similiar, but ideas must be superior. Coming on 
the scene about this time we notice another movement, one that may be the 
most revolutionary and most far reaching in the history of philosophy. This 
is the Sophist movement which concluded that the knowing subject was the 
most important, and therefore it should be the matter of study. Knowledge, 
they held, depended wholly upon the individual, as a result there cannot 
be objective, absolute truth which would be the same for all men, or as 
Protagoras stated, "Man is the measure of all things," and this included 
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even truth and knowledge. By making all knowledge dependent on the 
individual, by denying the possibility of sure universal knowledge, their 
action forced philosophers to investigate thinking more clearly and in this 
manner opened the door for a theory of knowledge. As a result of this 
stand they gave cause to look at knowledge and to hasten the discovery 
of rules of thinking. 
It could be said that Socrates snatched up this gauntlet (with 
immediacy) and proceeded to formulate the first procedural techniques 
that cleared the way for the development of a theory of knowledge. He 
held that the problem of knowledge was the key to all other problems, but 
his interest seemed to be in discovering a method for reaching true knowledge 
rather than mere opinion. In this methodology he sought to clear away all 
false notions, and then by observation and thought to reach universal judg­
ments, or a position that would be common to all and which could not be 
disputed. Having defined this principle it would be possible to sequen­
tially define other principles. 
Following in this vein, Plato agreed with the notion that sense 
perception could not give genuine knowledge. It is necessary to go beyond 
the senses to ideas that are not derived from experience and not dependent 
on experience. In the soul are implanted ideas, these are in its existence 
before birth, and true knowledge is reached when these ideas are remembered 
and become conscious. These ideas show the essence of things rather than 
the mere accidental aspects of the object. 
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Carrying this line of reason further, Aristotle argued that since our 
world of experience is the real world, genuine knowledge consists of 
knowing the reasons or causes of things. To arrive at these basic causes, 
true processes of thought must be followed and to this end be developed 
his system of deductive logic, a system so complete that little has been 
added to it till comparatively recent times. 
After Plato and Aristotle, the Epicureans and Stoics took positions 
at variance with those held by these men. The Epicureans turned to the 
senses as the basis for truth, in the view that all knowledge comes through 
the senses and error is the result of a mistake in the interpretation of our 
sensations. Thus if we do not get our ideas confounded we end up with 
truth about the real world. The Stoics pictured the mind as an empty tablet 
at birth. Sensory perception, after this result in memory-image s which the 
mind organizes into general ideas, our real knowledge comes therefore 
from our impressions and our organization of these ideas. 
This last position is quite obviously at variance with that held by 
Plato. He was a rationalist in holding that the mind had ideas independent 
of experience, while the Stoics were empirical in their approach holding 
that ideas were the result of experience. We can then trace to their Greek 
origins the two great traditions that are to be found in philosophy; the 
rationalists who hold that the ideas which man has are innate and the 
empiricists who claim that the mind has no ideas of its own. As we look 
at the development of philosophy from this point on we will be able to note 
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that it has been more or less a battle between various forms of these two 
major positions y as regards knowledge. 
During the medieval period the discussion continues but the terms 
of reference change , we now find that we have a conflict between nominalists 
and realists. To the realists ideas are general concepts or universals that 
have an existence independently of things or experiences, ideas are real in 
the sense that they do not come about as a creation of the individuals 
experience. To the nominalist, on the other hand, ideas are the result of 
experience; without the support of experience ideas cannot exist. In addition 
to these two forms a supplementing form, that of revealed knowledge which 
comes thru faith was superimposed. This was necessary to permit the christian 
scholars to protect the doctrines of the church. It permitted man to extend 
the bounds of knowledge far beyond the limits of natural experience, for when 
man reached the restrictive limits of logical reasoning it was possible for 
him to proceed from this point and go on to accept the doctrines of the church. 
This established the doctrine of two-fold truth, one aspect of which 
could be substantiated by logical reasoning and the other by faith and the 
authority of the church. Thomas Aquinas established his philosophy in this 
principle, one phase of his thinking dealt with ideas developed through the 
senses, this was the foundation of conceptual knowledge. On the other side 
was intuitive knowledge, greater than that gained through the senses, through 
reason or through mere faith, it had divine revelation as a source and was 
considered as superior to that coming from experience. 
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During these years it was possible for the church to suppress any 
conclusions that were not in the interest of what it held to be revealed 
truth, but in the 16th and 17th century the scientist be^an to realize what 
could be done through experience, observation, and thought. They were 
unwilling to continue to accept an authoritarian direction to their thought 
process and their discoveries led them to place greater reliance on the 
mind of man to build its own thought patterns, in effect they were demanding 
the right to think independently and to reject conclusions imposed through 
authority. 
Bacon proposed an inductive process; to reach a justified conclusion 
man must examine all variations of an event and on the basis of this data 
it would be possible to reach a true solution. Beginning with Descartes, 
philosophers centered their attention on the structure of the mind, on the 
subject of knowledge rather than its object. There is a new stress on self-
consciousness as the only immediately certain knowledge. The question as 
to how we know external reality became the point of emphasis. This 
subjective idealistic tendency in Descartes' thought appeared to be derived 
from his concern for the attainment of absolutely certain knowledge and was 
directed toward providing a solid unquestionable foundation for such know­
ledge . Starting with one universal method, he hoped to arrive at one 
universal science, a systematic knowledge of all things knowable to man. 
He established the fundamental principle of all thinking as being all true 
ideas must be clear and distinct. 
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What Plato and Aristotle did for the emerging philosophy of 
antiquity, Locke may be said to have done for modern philosophy. He 
laid the foundations of his thinking in empiricism and this frequently gets 
him into difficulty as it does for many other empiricists. His basic dilemma 
has been expressed by John Randall as follows: "We know the world only 
by experience, not by reasoning; yet what we know is not the world, but 
only experience. We must defer to facts, but there are no facts, only ideas." 
(58) Locke made the study of knowing his chief occupation. His conclusion 
was that all ideas come to the individual through sense experience. There 
are no innate ideas, for the mind is a blank tablet with only the power to 
assimilate or organize impressions. The ideas received through sense 
impressions are simple ideas, and as these are organized, complex ideas 
are built in the mind. Locke's treatment of the degree, extent, and reality 
of knowledge appears to give greater stress and attention to the faculty of 
understanding itself. "If we can find out how far the understanding can 
extend its views, how far it has faculties to attain certainity and in what 
cases it can only judge and guess, we may content ourselves with what is 
attainable by us in this state.. .When we know our own strength we shall 
then better know what to undertake with hopes of success; and when we 
have well surveyed the power of our own minds and made some estimate of 
what we may expect from them we shall be inclined either to sit still and not 
set our thoughts to work at all, in despair of knowing anything, not on the 
other side question everything and disclaim all knowledge because some 
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things are not to be understood. " (44) 
Berkeley desired to develop a theory of knowledge in accordance 
with common sense tenets. He felt that Locke, following the lead of 
Newton, had violated common sense with his theory of primary and 
secondary qualities. To Berkeley, it seemed that this view of sense 
experience jeopardized the reality of knowledge. Reality, in the 
Newtonian and Lockeian picture consists of "solid, massy, hard, 
imperturbable, movable, particles." Our perceptions, however, tell us 
of things that are blue, hot, etc. Consequently our knowledge is not 
real, by Locke's own test of the reality of knowledge. Berkeley's efforts 
are directed to recasting the picture of the world and the account of 
knowledge is such a fashion that knowledge will assuredly be real. 
The problem of the reality of knowledge for Locke was in knowing 
whether there is conformity between our ideas and the things of which 
they are the ideas. Berkeley's solution is to deny the distinction between 
ideas and things of which they are ideas. What we know, he says, are 
our ideas, and there is nothing outside the mind to which these ideas refer, 
or if there is it is totally unknowable anyhow and in no way affects our 
knowledge. There is not need to go any further; in fact, it is foolish to 
try to have knowledge beyond the realm of our idea. As he says " .. .As 
to what is said about existence of unthinking things without any relation to 
their perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their "esse" is 
"percepi," nor is it possible they should have existence out of the minds of 
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thinking things which perceive them. " (9) To exist means to be perceived, 
therefore bodies have no existence without mind. The mind creates the 
material world and this world has existence only in the mind. 
David Hume went one step further and showed that on the basis of 
Locke's dualism, we cannot prove even the existence of mind. All that we 
can prove is that ideas, impressions, come one after another. Where they 
come from cannot be proven. There is, for Hume, no material world and no 
mind; just a succession of ideas. "If you insist that the inference is made 
by a chain or reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. " (33) All 
the contents of the mind are ideas in certain relations. Beyond this we cannot 
go. We have ideas and think in terms of them and their relations. Here we 
must stop; we cannot demonstrate anything beyond this. 
Leibniz' proposals are contrary to those of Locke and Hume. His 
philosophy has all ideas contained within the Monads. Experience merely 
brings them to the front. The senses, he held, can arouse, justify and verify 
these facts but cannot demonstrate their eternal and inevitable certitude. 
Ideas and truths are innate in the mind as tendencies. We do not receive 
ideas, but have them at all times. He agreed with Locke in holding that there 
was nothing in the intellect that did not exist before in sensation, but 
criticized him for not having gone farther and not adding "except the intellect 
itself.'! 
It is Kant who sought to overcome the difficulties of both extremes 
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here presented. He held that we do receive impressions from the environ­
ment, from the thing-in itself, but the mind is of such a nature that it 
shapes these impressions into ideas. But knowledge is universal, this is 
due to the fact that all minds are fundamentally alike and therefore we all 
think very much alike. We make impressions into ideas and since these are 
of the mind they can be applied to a world outside the mind. It follows then 
that we cannot know the world outside of the mind. We can, of course, 
bring ideas into large generalizations, and we can act as though these were 
true, but we are dealing with generalizations and not provable ideas. 
Fichte was led from the arguments of Kant to the conclusion that one 
can understand only that which one can create freely in thought. Our ideas 
are a result of an act of creation. The ego, by which Fichte means reason or 
intelligence, creates everything that man knows. The whole array of ideas 
that we know exist before the individual, they are not the result of the 
material world which we experience, but come from the universal ego. 
Beginning with a particular finite ego which posits a world for action, he ends 
by assimilating both to an absolute ego which posits both. (2) 
For Hegel the processes of the mind and those of nature are the same, 
within each we find a dialectical process. In the mind we find contradictions, 
disagreements and oppo sites, but there is a process by which these opposite s 
are reconciled in a syntheses which includes both, but at a higher level. 
This process is everywhere. The human mind is not satisfied with contra-
diction but seeks to get rid of them by effecting a synthesis in which 
the values of both aspects are concerned and together they move to new 
values. The highest function then of knowledge is to see opposite s 
unified. Thought is not static, a mere receiving of impressions, it is a 
living logical process in which there is an unfolding and a progression. 
Hegel conceives his dialectic as a law of thought and a law of 
being. The individual when considered in itself becomes an abstraction. 
The only real or concrete entity is the Absolute itself. Everything else 
is but a moment of the Absolute. "Thus by a paradox to end all paradoxes, 
the only reality, in Hegel's view, remains for us an ideal of reason which 
is always realized by particular processes that never really are. " (52) 
Philosophy seems to move away from this note in recent times; the 
interest does not seem to lie in the genesis of ideas as much as in their 
working in actual life situations. Ideas become the tools for solving 
problems. Thinking is one way to meet difficult situations. Its effective­
ness seems to be the measure of success the individual experiences from 
its use. But the question of knowledge remains critical; the question seems 
always to be "what can man know?" To this existentialists answer by 
saying we can know the human condition; as to how man can know they 
answer: by intuitive insight from affective experiences. In reply to the 
question of the value of human knowledge, they answer that proper under­
standing of human condition is essential to the experience of values. 
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the only values genuinely available to man. (53) Berdyaev crystalizes 
these ideas in the following statement, "For knowledge, existence begins 
to reveal itself from below, not from above. With Marx as hunger, as 
economics, with Freud as desire, sex. With Heidegger as worry and fear. 
From above existence reveals itself as spirit. The supreme mystery of 
knowledge is that knowledge of material things is possible, when knowl­
edge by its nature is not material. Thomas Aquinas faced this problem as 
a problem of the intellect. But the problem is solvable only if we recognize 
that knowledge is existential, that in it the darkness of being is enlightened, 
that it is capable of taking the objectivized world within the spirit... Know­
ledge and other states of mind. " (7) 
Knowledge in relation to other states of mind 
The theory of knowledge is a field of many disputes, but it appears 
that one fact seems to go unquestioned by all philosophers, this is that 
there is an unquestioned relationship existing between a knower and a known. 
William James expressed this insight, perhaps somewhat strongly and more 
dogmatically than many would allow, as follows, "Knowledge is a thorough­
going dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing know... 
Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, 
neither makes the other. They just stand face to face in a common world, 
and one simply knows or is known to its counterpart. " (34) This remains 
true even when turned to the special case of knowledge about knowledge or 
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the knower knowing himself. The mind's examination of itself makes the 
mind an object to be known as well as a knower. This point will be referred 
to later in this discussion, but at this point it must be noted that for any 
theory of the nature of knowledge we must necessarily distinguish between 
knov^dge and ignorance, between having or not having something in mind. 
This should also point to the fact that ignorance is not error. The mind in 
error claims to know something about which it is, in fact, ignorant. In 
Meno, Socrates points out that a person aware of his ignorance is easier 
to teach than one who is in error and as he further points out that getting 
a person to acknowledge this is often the indispensible first step in teaching. 
However, although the distinction between ignorance and knowledge 
and between ignorance and error seems to be understood and readily admitted, 
not everyone admits to or agrees on the difference between knowledge and 
error. The point of agreement appears, at first glance, to be this; to know 
is to possess the truth about something, whereas to err is to be deceived by 
falsity mistaken for truth. But the disagreement begins when the meaning of 
'truth' and 'falsity' is examined. 
Truth is one thing for those who insist upon some similarity between 
the thing known and that by which it is known or represented in the mind. 
It is another for those who think that knowledge can be gained without the 
mediation of images or representations. In the first instance it must consist 
of some kind of correspondence between what the mind thinks or understands 
and the reality it tries to know. In the second instance it would be a 
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consistency between the mind's own ideas. 
The definition of truth as the agreement of the mind with reality 
leaves some problems to be solved. As James indicates in his Principles 
of Psychology, the theory of truth begins rather than ends with its 
definition. How do we know when our ideas correspond with reality? By 
what signs or norms do we. know their truth or falsity? This definition 
implies that truth is the property of ideas rather than of things. Aristotle 
holds that falsity and truth are not in things but in thought. Aquinas 
distinguished between the sense in which truth and falsity are primarily in 
the intellect and secondarily in things, in so far as they are related to the 
intellect as their source. This at once, in the position of Aquinas, points 
to profound difference between truth in the Divine and in the human intellect. 
In the human sphere, the interpretation may be different as it is 
made a property of words or ideas. Locke says that to have a distinct 
notion of truth one must consider the truth of words and of thought distinctly 
from one another. (44) The words are signification of what ideas the mind 
has, but the ideas are the expressions of the reality they represent. The 
truth in each instance is dependent on the exactness of the representation; 
but as he continues, verbal truth may be chimerical because it can exist 
whether our ideas really have or are capable of having reference to existence 
in nature. Hobbes, however, would maintain that truth was the result of 
the ordering of names in our affirmations. His conclusion is that the holding 
of false and senseless tenets arises from a want of definitions or from 
false definitions. Some, like Kant, distinguish between-the truth which 
a proposition has when it conforms to the rules of thought and the truth 
it has when it represents nature. Valid reasoning alone cannot guarantee 
that a conclusion is true in fact, this depends on the truth of the 
premises upon their being true to the nature of things. 
Some thinkers ideas have their own intrinsic marks by which they 
reveal their truth or falsity. Augustine posits God as the warranty of the 
inner voice which plainly signifies the truth; for Spinoza, the truth of 
an idea depends on its relation to God. Descartes and Locke give as 
the criterion of truth the clarity and distinctness of ideas, but they do 
not seem to mean, as does Spinoza, the single idea in and of itself, but 
rather the proposition which involves at least two ideas, or as Kant says, 
"Truth and error.. .are only found in a judgement. " 
The criterion of truth gives rise to the question of the cause of 
error. Socrates explained that false opinions arise when the senses and 
mind do not co-operate properly, others suggest that it is the imagination 
that misleads the mind. Some, for whom the senses are infallible, attribute 
error to the fault of reason which misinterprets the accurate impressions of 
the senses. Descartes would intimate that the intellect is more reliable 
than the senses and so the senses are the source error. Montaigne finds 
that both the senses and the reason are fallible, and Pascal says "Man is 
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full of error, natural and ineffaceable, without grace. Nothing shows him 
the truth. Everything deceives him. These two sources of truth, reason 
and the senses, beside being wanting in sincerity, deceive each other in 
term." (55) 
If we consider only the relationship between these aspects of 
knowledge we would be neglecting a very important distinction between 
knowledge and opinion. Here the difference is not the same as exists 
between knowledge and error, it is not a matter of truth or falsity. There 
is such a thing as right opinion and this can have as much use and validity 
as knowledge. It has been held that an individual holding the right 
opinion will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows 
the truth. The contrast between right opinion and knowledge is expressed 
in this context as was emphasis on the works "think" and "know. " It does 
not relate to the truth of the conclusion, but rather in the manner in which 
that conclusion was reached or is held in the mind. 
There does appear to be at least one deficiency of right opinion as 
compared with knowledge: it lacks stability and permanence. Yet such 
notions, when fixed in the mind by the reasons on which they are grounded, 
would have the nature of knowledge and thus permanence. From this we 
might deduce that a proposition which is neither self-evident nor demon­
strated expresses an opinion rather than knowledge. Even when true it is 
qualified by some degree of doubt and some estimate of probability, and 
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this is to be contrasted with the situation in which the mind has adequate 
grounds for its judgement; when it knows what it knows and why, it has 
knowledge. 
The relationships that have been discussed between knowledge and 
different states of the mind have been noted in context of several philosophies 
which cover much of the thinking of man, but as noted above in a reference 
to knowledge of the self, little has been seen of the existential position 
relative to this aspect of the discussion. We note that the existential 
thinker is concerned with the knowledge about the human condition; not the 
human history, natural or social environment or the laws of human behavior, 
but the certain general traits that remain the same through all ages: of man's 
contingency, particularity, and freedom,pf his fundamental aspirations and of 
the basic ways in which man can relate to the world and to other human beings. 
The existentialist denies any sharp difference between intellect and passion 
or at least with regard to the latter as a condition for the operation of the 
former. He also maintains that the insights delivered in the experience of 
anguish are but the rendering explicit of the state of affairs in which the 
individual is deeply involved and that he in some sense already knows what 
anguish reveals to him. 
If existentialism is the call for acceptance of these ideas it should be 
evident that the relationship of the various states of mind also must apply 
to the system they propose. Yet as Brown points out, "any matter of rational 
inquiry must be allowed a certain elbow-room or breathing-space, as it were. 
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in which to develop its own corners of intelligibility, to define its own kind 
of objectivity, to which it pretends in the name of truth." (13) Existentialism 
is opposed to idealism, positivism, materialism, to a dogmatic faith or 
rationalism, to individualism or collectivism. These are not rejected because 
they are one-sided or extreme but because they cover or hide the nature of 
the problem. Existentialists hold these proposals not merely as wrong 
solutions, but as the wrong kind of solutions. These thinkers hold essentially 
that although the proposals dispose of the problem, the problem cannot be dis­
posed of because it makes the human condition. Human reality is "awareness 
of" and "intention to" and thus constitues itself and constitues the world 
for itself in its thoughts and projects. (10) 
The extent of human knowledge 
In the preceeding sections it has been noted that the scope of know­
ledge extends to all things knowable, to all kinds of knowers, to all methods 
of knowing, and to all modes of knowledge. But it might be held that certain 
questions are prior to all of these: first, is knowledge possible, and second, 
can we know anything? The skeptic will challenge the man who thinks that 
knowledge is attainable or even claims to possess knowledge of any sort. 
In its most extreme form skeptics will hold that there is nothing true or false. 
From their point of view skeptics will look at their position as irrefutable as 
long as they do not allow themselves to accept any standards by which 
refutation can be accepted. But such a position is generally self refuting 
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for the moment the skeptic expresses himself definitely on any subject he 
has demonstrated a preference and a decision. This leaves only two courses 
of action, first to make statements in defiance of self contradiction or 
second to remain silent. Now this is not intended to refer to the philosophic 
aspect of skepticism which is useful and has been employed to arrive at 
truth. This, as Hume remarks, makes one "sensible of the strange infirmities 
of human understanding, " and enables the thinker to delve deeper into the 
matter and more clearly apprehend the truth or falsity of a position. 
Everyone expresses doubt as to various matters of life; in the broadest 
philosophic sense a skeptic is one who for specific reasons questions the 
validity of what others regard as truth. Descartes raised the question as to 
what guarantee one would have that all one had been taught, all we had 
accepted from tradition, all our sensory apperceptions, were true. He 
reasoned that if he were ever to have a guarantee that he had valid knowledge 
he must, so to speak, start with a clean slate. He must probe everyone of 
his beliefs, doubt all of them even the fact of his own existence. This part 
of skepticism was not something with which he ended, but rather that with 
which he must begin. His skepticism then is only a method or device that 
he used to arrive at a refutation of skepticism. The refutation takes the form 
of the view that there are intuitive or self evident first principles of knowledge. 
It does merit the name skepticism, since it is the method by which each 
individual, through a resort to universal doubt, can assure himself that there 
is absolute and certain knowledge. 
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Kant developed in this respect an attitude of skepticism as 
opposed to a method advanced in the Cartesian philosophy. He endeavored 
to investigate the foundations of knowledge. He held that whatever could 
be called knowledge must justify itself as such. By this he meant; that 
whatever we hold must be explained in the sense in which it is knowledge; 
what kind of knowledge it is; what is it's scope; and what degree of 
certainty it holds. His origin in this critical spirit shows an unwillingness 
to accept conclusions unless there are good grounds for these contentions. 
Yet this method was not new y we must note it in the Dialogues of Plato, 
and of course it is evident in the empirical and scientific method in which 
evidence is scrutinized and each conclusion is open to re-examination. 
Considering this problem further we should note two other approaches 
to the scope of knowledge: the first is the approach made through a method 
of authority, intuition or faith, and the second the method of empiricism. 
The first has been referred to by Kant as dogmatism in that it lays claim 
to knowledge without a critical examination of the methods and principles on 
which that claim is based. The intellectual system erected on religious 
authority and faith exemplify this approach. It has been held by philosophers 
that the dogmatists are those who accept "self evident" truths uncritically, 
or who create elaborate chains of reasoning in which conclusions are drawn 
without analysis of the justification of basic principles. The extremes to 
which empiricism has been carried has developed another approach to this 
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problem of what can be known. With Kant we note that his skepticism led 
him to the denial of the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, the ideas 
in this area have no theoretical or cognitive value but are of immense moral 
value as being ideas on which all our practical conduct must ultimately be 
based. For extreme empiricists this value is not attributed to metaphysics, 
which they hold as a useless branch of inquiry and serves only for the 
labeling of theories which cannot be directly tested by sense observation. 
These adherents place total emphasis on the scientific method, and they 
do not admit any theory that cannot be directly tested in experience. 
If we look now at the scope and extent of knowledge, what we can 
know, we see that it must be influenced by this variety of approaches. And 
if we start with God as the object of knowledge in this discussion, we note 
an immediate variety of interpretation. The crux of the problem seems to 
arise from the otherness of the concept. Thus the narrower the metaphysical 
approach that the philosopher holds, the more restricted will his response 
be to the problem of the knowledge of God. 
Any philosophy that reduces that otherness to a specious otherness, 
simply must reject the knowledge of God even though there is verbal 
acceptance. Materialism, naturalism and idealism insist that being is homo­
genous and consequently there can be no otherness within being. Naturalism 
makes God some aspect of nature, and this obviously makes him cease to be 
God. Idealism makes God the ultimate subject of thought, either as a sum 
total of all thought whereby it can be a cohesive substance, as in the case of 
Hegel, or as the subsisting thought at the center with dependent thoughts 
projected by it to a periphery. Reality then being thought is one in substance, 
but many immodes, which are still one with the basic substance, and in this 
case there is no otherness. The intuitive approach accepts the notion of the 
noumenon without critical evaluation, since man is constantly thrown up against 
the limits of his own being and thus is thrust upon God who bounds him in. 
As Tillich holds "God is beyond categories, and to force him into categories 
is idolotry..(75) The rationalist approach holds that it is possible to 
arrive at a knowledge of the noumenon through reasoned reflection in reality. 
The rationalists analyze reality as it is met and through this analysis see the 
relation that connects the finite to the infinite. There is no experience of 
God but there is proof of his existence. We do not meet him directly but 
there is evidence that he is attached to everything we meet. (78) 
The existentialist approaches to the knowledge of God runs the gamut 
from atheism to acceptance with philosophical faith and discret refusal to 
make a philosophical committment, serving as an intermediate step. In the 
one instance we are brought face to face with the atheistic thinkers who point 
in their manner to the seriousness of the "God-forsakenness" of modern man. 
On the other hand most other existentialists, in their attempts to point out 
the ways to overcome the estrangement of man, have discovered a character­
istic openness of the human conduct toward God. The unanimity of the 
existentialist on the importance of the question of God disintegrates however. 
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with their separate representations. Kierkegaard stands at one end of the 
existential continuum: for him God is infinite and absolute, he does not 
ask if such a God exists; how to live a life in relation to this infinite and 
absolute God is the crux of human existence. At the other end of this 
continuum is the Sartrean approach, which denies God completely and out-
rightly. The absence of God leaves a universe without pre-set meaning; 
man, the new master, sets it. In between these two extremes we find 
Jaspers who would have God to be found in the constant a nd purely individual 
search for the path to transcendence. Although he acknowledges the 
experience of religious prophets as valid and genuine, he insists that 
everyone has his own experience of God. Brie sack says of the existential 
position on this knowledge of God... "Without having to choose between 
the Scylla of pseudo-scientific atheistic humanism and the Charybdis of a 
'proved' God or one pictured in dogmas or creeds. The existentialists have 
again opened to everyone the door to the religious realm in the spirit of a 
personal exploration. Those who prefer sophisticated theoretical discussions 
of God or who are looking only for a consoling certitude will have no use for 
the existential position on God and his relation to man. Others, however, 
will find its possibilities intriguing." (14) 
When we look to the extent of human knowledge in respect to the 
knowability of matter we note that the existentialists stand in a position 
that is between the idealists and the materialists. The idealists attempts 
to resolve the struggle that is to be found between the individual mind 
and the world by explaining the world as a projection of the mind. To the 
materialists the individual mind is submerged in a vast sea of matter. This 
alone is reality. Before considering the existentialists position, it would 
be proper to look at the specifics of these two points of view first, to note 
their impact on this problem and second, to form a base on which a 
comparison can rest. 
If it were possible to put the various concepts of philosophers on 
a continuum in respect to the manner in which they hold that matter is 
known, it would perhaps be correct to say that the idealists would be at 
one end and the materialist at the other, with a vast number of inter­
pretations to be noted in between. If we consider idealism first we see 
that it holds that our sense-data cannot be supposed to have any 
existence independent of us, but must be, in part at least, in the mind. 
Berkeley made the first attempt to establish such a theory and held 
additionally that unless this mind was present, the existence of the 
object could not continue. From this he reasoned that sense-data were 
t h e  o n l y  t h i n g s  o f  w h o s e  e x i s t e n c e  o u r  p e r c e p t i o n s  c o u l d  a s s u r e  u s ,  
and that to be known is to be mental or in the mind. Materialism, 
on the other hand, would hold that all realities can be reduced to 
material properties undergoing change of motion in space. This means 
that all the sciences treat of phenomena which, if fully analyzed, 
would be causally reduced to material phenomena; 
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it also implies that the mind is but the complex working of the bra in ^  the 
nervous system and the other bodily organs; and lastly it implies that 
"values," "ideals," "purposes" and such words are but names or subjective 
human tags for different physical situations in which physical organisms 
find themselves. 
Now if we consider the existential stand, we see it never denies 
the reality of either the mind or the world but, rather, is careful to preserve 
the tension between the two. "The world is mine but still remains strange. 
That it is here, I experience as a brutal fact." (68) But no trick can give 
man the knowledge of what it is and thus make it a comfortable place to 
live. Brie sack states this position and shows this middle of the road 
stand in this excerpt; "Neither a denial of the reality of the world nor a 
denial of the uniqueness of man, nor a set of benevolent laws of nature nor 
divine providence can eliminate the fundamental fact of the human condition, 
that no miraculous harmony exists in the world and that to resolve the 
enormous tension between man and his world is beyond human power... 
Both the personal character of man's world and his being a stranger in it 
everyone can discover for himself in his own life. " (14) 
Such a position is not conciliatory nor is it an arbitrary denial of 
the positions established by the philosophers who hold to an idealistic or 
a materialistic emphasis, it is rather a position in which the existentialist 
fuses the world with his personality and which he embraces fully in his 
encounter with reality. This is characterized by Heidegger's "being-
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thrown-in-the-world" by virtue of which everything is no longer "just-
there" but "there-for-me," 
Another aspect to be considered when looking at the extent of human 
knowledge is that of the self. Within this area existential thought is at 
greatest odds with the Hegelian approach and it is Kierkegaard who is the 
main proponent. But we might look at the rationalist and the empirical 
positions once more before discussing this point in any detail. To the 
questions "What can man expect to know?" "What are the methods by 
which men acquire knowledge?" and "Why should men know?" we find 
two distinct and contrary positions. For the rationalist the answer to what 
man can know is; "Whatever is eternal, necessary and universal. That 
which is temporal, contingent, and particular cannot be known. The 
empirists hold that we can know particular beings and the relationships 
that obtain among them. The "how" is answered by the rationalist as 
through the mind or intellect and for the empiricist as through the physical 
senses. The why of knowledge for the rationalist is because of its own 
right; through it he experiences the greatest pleasures, and through it man 
learns to conduct himself in a world of becoming. The why for the empiricist 
is for the sake of power, the power to transform the natural and social 
environment. Against these stand the existential answers that we can know 
the human condition by intuitive insight resulting from affective experiences, 
and that this knowledge will provide a proper understanding of the human 
condition and existentialist values. 
To look more explicitly at the notion of a knowable self we should 
consider the position of Kierkegaard. The self, as he sees it, cannot be 
understood as an object, that is "I am present to myself not as an object 
but as a subject." (56) This awareness is practical not theoretical. It 
is not an abstract point of view, detached from any active desires and 
tendencies, but rather is intimately united with them. Thus this mind 
introspects the tendencies of self as they are proceeding; it further reveals 
a world that is essentially an alien existence; a world that at times will be 
an aid, at times a burden and at times a source of frustration. This is the 
awareness and knowledge of self that the existentialists would propose. 
This is not the idealized notion of Hegel, who in his Philosophy of Right 
defines the self as "The transition from undifferentiated undetermining to 
the differentiation, determination, and positing of a determinancy as a 
content and object. " Or as he describes the nature of the self in his Logic; 
"By the term T I mean myself, a single and altogether determinate person. 
And yet I really utter nothing peculiar to myself, for everyone else is an T 
or 'Ego, ' and when I call myself 'I, ' though I indubitably mean the single 
person myself, I express a thorough universal. 'I,' therefore, is mere being-
for-self, in which everything peculiar or marked is renounced or buried out 
of sight; it is as it were the ultimate and unanallayzable point of conscious­
ness. We may say 'I' and thought are the same, or, more definitely .'1' is 
thought as a thinker. " (28) From this statement and from the basic under-
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standing of the underlying principles or tenets of Hegel's philosophy we can 
see that the existing person is identified with thought. This, as Kierkegaard 
points out, is the identity of subject and object, the unity of thought and 
being, a tautology, because this being which is ascribed to the thinker does 
not signify that he is, but only that he is thinking. (35) Kierkegaard 
rejects the definition of man as essentially mind, he gives emphasis to the 
existing individual. 
We can see the position of Kierkegaard in reference to knowledge of 
self as being contrary to the positions held by the rationalists, the 
empiricists and most especially to the idealist position exemplified in 
Hegel. And of course at this point it is well to ask why this divergent stand? 
Heinemann (30) maintains that he acts as a provocation to thought, calling 
on his reader to question his established opinions and to rethink his whole 
position. His philosophical solution of this problem may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Only knowledge that has essential relationship to existence 
is essential knowledge. 
2. Objective reflection leads away from the subject to abstract 
objective truth, and while the subject and his subjectivity 
becomes indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent. 
3. In subjective reflection truth becomes appropriation, inward­
ness, subjectivity, therefore it is mandatory that the subject 
plunge itself into its own subjectivity. 
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4, Only ethical and religious knowledge are essential know­
ledge, and are alone related to the fact that the knowing 
subject exists. In this knowledge alone can truth and 
existence coincide. 
What are the implications of these conclusions? They represent a 
reaction, not only against Hegel, but against all modern methods of thought 
as it becomes more abstract. They emphasize what it means to live as a 
human being, rather than to stress a senseless accumulation of knowledge. 
They discard the old distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact 
since these ignore or neglect what is essential, true existence, i.e. 
existence in the face of God. 
The existentialist holds that the individual comes into the world as 
a thinker after he became aware of the "other, " of the body, of the world. 
The object of knowledge is thus given before the ability to react, to decide. 
By this is meant that human reality is "awareness of" and "intention to" and 
thus constitutes itself and constitutes the world for itself in its thoughts and 
projects. For Marcel, self is a creative engagement of the self in relation 
to something other. The real self is pure possibility unless and until it 
realizes and establishes itself in decisions; it comes into existence only in 
coming to decisions. 
Although this concept of self adds a further dimension of decision, 
we may note a similarity between the notion of the existentialists and that 
offered by Bergson, "There is one reality, at least which we all seize from 
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within y by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality 
in its flowing through time - our self which underlies. " (8) 
As a means of summarizing the position of the existentialist on the 
knowable and relating this stand to the art of counseling it would be well 
to quote at this point from Gordon Allport. "Each person is an idiom into 
himself / an apparent violation of the syntax of the species. An idiom 
develops in its own particular context, and this context must be understood 
to understand the idiom. Yet at the same time idioms are not entirely 
lawless and arbitrary; indeed they can be known for what they are only by 
comparing them with the syntax of the species. " (3) The existentialist is 
not one who questions the possibility of human knowledge, nor does he 
place any philosophic limitations on this knowledge, but he does place it 
in direct confrontation with the human existence, or as Marcel states, 
" .. .Knowledge is contingent on a participation in being for which no episte-
mology can account because it presupposes it, " (48) 
The ends and use of knowledge 
To this point we have looked at knowledge in a general sense and 
have seen that the problems related to the nature of knowledge and to the 
relations that obtain between it and its objects are fundamental in philosophy, 
since everything is given to us in and through knowledge. But it is now 
important that this consideration be brought a level of practicality and that 
these ideas be related to first, the ends of knowledge and then to the use 
53 
and value of knowledge. 
Without question one would be hard pressed to find in the human 
tradition a cult of ignorance! It must follow then that, by and large, the 
effort to dispel this state could be looked at as a prime end of knowledge, 
in fact not even those, who Ifke Rousseau, have gloried in the pristine 
innocence of man, or those who have scoffed at the pedantic efforts of 
certain students to attain to wisdom, would question the notion that men 
by nature desires to know. Nor could one find much argument to the 
statement that knowledge is good, and that its possession contributes to 
the happiness of man. But more germane to the question is not the what 
but why! 
Knowledge for the sake of knowing is a very limiting and surely a 
restrictive consideration in looking at the entire problem of knowledge. It 
must be looked at in its purpose and, in the context of this paper, in its 
precise relationship to the way in which this relates to the art of counseling. 
We cannot assume that an individual can act in a manner that would 
be consistent with reality unless such an individual had some degree of 
knowledge. To make such an assumption would be to state that the conduct 
of the idiot or imbecile would have the same relevance to truth and reality 
as would those knowledgeable acts of the genius. If we made this state­
ment we would deny the many decisions of our courts who hold that knowledge 
is a basic ingredient of intent. Thus we first note that for the direction of 
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conduct the first requisite is knowledge and that without it any criterion of 
behavior cannot be developed. As a corollary of this we must recognize 
also that it is an essential characteristic of voluntariness since unless we 
know of our relationship to the act it would be impossible to give or 
withhold consent. 
From this consideration it follows that this problem of knowledge is 
closely tied to the art of counseling. This is evident from the already quoted 
objective of counseling "to develop the individual's inner life through concern 
with his motivation... " This in no way denies any particular theory of know­
ledge whether it be based in the philosophy of realism, empiricism, idealism 
or positivism. But, by the same token, it does not rule out the more irrational 
and humanistic approach of the existentialist who deny neither the reality of 
the mind or matter, but maintain between mind and matter a brutal tension, and 
stress and uniqueness of the individual. 
If we take as a point of reference a comment by Olson, "the commanding 
value in life is intensity as manifested in acts of choice, individual self 
assertion, personal love or creative work..." (53) The value of intellectual 
knowledge becomes necessarily subjective and relative in so far as it is 
specified by the organic needs of the active subjects. From such subjective 
characteristics the reconstruction of a realistic metaphysics would appear to be 
unnecessary, and further the human concepts, being only useful symbols, would 
also lessen the demand for a system of knowledge based on a firmly rooted 
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rationalistic philosophy. These considerations would appear to provide 
some merit to the notion that the position of the existentialists relative to 
the problem of knowledge are compatible in the approach to the art of 
counseling. 
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THE PROBLEM OF BEING 
The study of "being" is a rather technical inquiry and one that 
philosophy seems to have pursued at length. According to Berkeley 
nothing seems of more importance toward erecting a firm system of real 
and sound knowledge than to lay a firm foundation in a distinct explanation 
of what is meant by the terms 'reality' and 'existence.' Philosophy appears 
to have taken on its very particular characteristics by just this attempt to 
answer this problem. Over the centuries it has raised and attempted to 
answer questions on the nature of existence, on the modes and properties 
of being, on the difference between being and becoming, between the 
actual and the possible and on being and nonbeing. 
These same questions and their answers have a very definite bearing 
on the individual in the counseling situation. He is concerned with those 
basic character! St s that define him as unique; he is involved in a process 
in which the outcome may be a change or may lead to a developing process 
that can lead to his realization of the actuality and potentiality of his 
individuality. It can be an activity that may define for him the particular 
characteristic of his personality, those specific aspects of his way of life, 
of his "being" that mark him as something other than a member of the common 
herd, that make him an individual with a right to be and to become. 
It can be seen then that there does exist a close relationship in these 
aspects of very different areas of study; in philosophy the need of making 
a determination of this question is fundamental per se; in counseling, to 
ignore it is to ignore an elemental, basic consideration. Therefore to 
treat either area lightly would be akin to making a prime error of omission. 
In looking at this problem we will attempt to review the problem historically, 
then to consider the particular situation as seen by the counselor, and 
finally to see the problem as seen by the existentialist thinker and to 
consider this particular aspect of the study as related to counseling. 
Historical aspects of the problem 
The problem of being was one that plagued the ancient philosophers 
and can even be seen in its carryover to the discussion of the religious 
question of the early fathers of Christianity in their discussion of "ousia" 
and "substantia." The ancients and most traditional non-christian 
philosophers regarded "being" as eternal and necessary; eternal because 
it had no beginning or end, and necessary since this could be demonstrated 
by logical reasoning. 
But to see this idea in its full context it should be studied in the 
light of the history of the notion; such an approach will enable us to note 
the changing emphasis and will provide a support upon which a basic 
understanding of the problem can be established. Once this aspect has been 
satisfied it should be possible to develop comparisons and to even note the 
particular areas of conflict or emphasis. 
Historically it can be said that Parmenides is the father of the 
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ontological tradition. To him, being is one and unchanging. Plato carried 
on in this tradition and rooted being in the realm of the idea. In this instance 
it is behind the moving and multiple world of the senses and is described 
again as unchanging and one. It is the unity of perfection, it is the highest 
idea, and the idea of "being" is the Being itself. As a result only immut­
able essences, eternal ideas are Beings, and though they are many in 
number they all belong to one realm and possess the same type of being. 
In the philosophy proposed by Aristotle there is a greater detail added, not 
only is the imperishable substance considered, but also the perishable. 
In addition to the immaterial and eternal being we must also consider the 
sensible and mutable substance. Thus we note that essential being is not 
the same as accidental and also that existence in reality is not the same as 
existence in the mind. From these considerations Aristotle claimed that 
there are many senses in which a thing is said to exist, some things are 
said to exist because they are substances others because they are 
appearances of substance or because they are in the process toward sub­
stance, or are relative to or negations of those things that are substance. 
In this last instance it is because of this that we say of nonbeing that it is 
nonbeing; or that in addition to substance there is that which Is" potentially 
or actually. Both Plato and Aristotle began their inquiry about being with 
the realization that after all questions have been answered about being, 
there still remained the question, "What does it mean to say of anything 
that it is or is not?" Thus after we recognize that a thing "is" we must still 
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consider what it means for that thing to be in anyway at all, to be in one 
sense and not in another. 
From this line of thought we are forced to the dichotomous system of 
questioning that says, first, if we classify being according to those 
characteristics which it shows with more and more things^ we come to "being" 
itself. This signifies the very least that can be thought of anything;, hence 
if we study the thing we learn the least possible about the thing by coming to 
a realization of its being since it is that which is common to all things; 
abstracted from all else "being" has only the positive meaning of excluding 
"nonbeing." In the opposite approach "being" has a maximum significance, 
since whatever else a thing is, it is a being. Its being lies at the very heart 
of its nature and underlies all its other properties, Aquinas, for example, 
follows this latter line of reasoning, being taken simply as including all 
perfections of being, being without qualifications, as the most proper name 
for God. In this sense "being" is the richest of terms, the one which has the 
greatest amplification of meaning. 
This method of thinking causes us to arrive at the problem of the one 
and the many in this context of "being, " In this we note the basis for 
Spianoza's contention that everything which is, is either in itself or in another; 
this permits him to hold that whatever multiplicity or diversity we find in the 
world are but aspects of one being. Thus he says, "The thing extended and the 
thinking things are either attributes of God or affections of the attributes of 
God." (71) 
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But if we hold that there is no unitary whole of being, that there is a 
plurality of being alike in being but diverse in being from one another , then 
our system involves one of meanings. Descartes in this instance distinguishes 
between the infinite being, whose essence involves existence, and finite 
beings which do not exist of themselves but must be caused to exist. The 
infinite, in Descartes view, causes but does not contain within itself other 
finite substances and among finite substance really distinct substances can 
exist apart from each other. These finite substances, Descartes holds, are 
first those in which thought, or the mind, immediately resides, and second 
those which are the immediate subject of extension in space and accidents 
that presuppose extension. In this instance substance has more reality than 
accident or mode and infinite substance has more than finite substance. The 
problem, then, of the one and the many is an issue between the philosophy of 
Spinosa and Descartes and is one of the ways in which the problem of being 
presents itself for clarification. 
Later philosophers, whose main concern was with the origin and validity 
of human knowledge, were not so much interested in an analysis of this 
problem but rather with the origin of the "ideas" of being or substance. Once 
the problems of being are viewed in terms of mind, the question becomes one 
of determining the conditions of our knowledge of existence and the identification 
of the real and ideas with matters of fact and intelligible relations between 
ideas. 
61 
In this context Kant saw it as a relation between the sensible and the 
supersensible, or the phenomenal or noumenal realm of being. Differently 
stated, he saw it as the being of the thing in itself as considered apart from 
human experience and the things of experience. The first concepts of the 
thing in itself are unconditioned but the latter are acted on by the knowing 
mind which is formative or constitutive of experience. In contrast to this 
approach we must see in Hegel, not an approach through a critique of knowledge, 
but rather the acceptance of the notion that nothing is actual except the idea, 
and to apprehend in the appearance of the temporal and the transient the 
substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present, or the reduction 
of everything to a manifestation of the underlying reality of the Absolute idea. 
The idea of change must be also observed in the concept of being. We 
will frequently note this basic issue concerning being and becoming as a 
recurring theme in western philosophy. This idea is implicit in Spinoza's 
concept of God's knowledge of things under the aspect of eternity and the 
man's temporal view of the world in process. They are relevant to Hegel's 
Absolute idea which while remaining fixed, progressively reveals itself in the 
changing aspects of nature and history. 
And one further consideration in this problem may be seen in the judge­
ment of reality of the thing, this consideration refers us back to the problem 
of knowledge and the meaning of reality which is derived from the notion of 
"thing-hood" or having being outside the mind, not merely in it. James 
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approaches this problem in a typically modern fashion by asking how do we 
know a thing to be real and in the same manner replies that, "any object 
which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute 
reality." (34) As an ultimate criterion for this reality he has established the 
self or ego, "the world of living reality as contracted with unreality seems to 
be anchored in the ego.. .whatever things have intimate and continuous 
connection with my life are things whose reality I cannot doubt. " (34) 
We might conclude from this brief overview of the problem of being, as 
looked at historically, that throughout the full spectrum of philosophical 
thought the attempt has been to affirm or deny the separate doctrines with 
respect to their emphasis of the notion of being and the modes of being. But 
to forget to look at this problem now in the light of existential thought would 
be to treat this subject too lightly! As Copieston said, "I think these problems 
can be called 'perennial' problems in the sense that they arise through 
concentration of attention, not on some temporary circumstance of man's life 
on some situation in which man is temporarily involved.. .but in man's abiding 
situation and on the condition of human existence as such." (18) 
Before proceeding with this discussion a modern position must also be 
looked into and this is that as taken by the "analytic philosophers. " With 
this group the neglect of existence in its various modes appears to have 
reached a climax. This group attempts to dispense with "existence" as an 
empty epithet. John Wild, quoting Quine states, "to speak of 'existent' and 
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'nonexistent,' 'real' and 'unreal' is but a bandying of empty honorific s and 
péjoratives.. .such ontological distinctions are dismissed as an accumulation 
of factually meaningless verbalisms." (79) All entities are reduced in this 
philosophy to the single level of phenomenal being with no essential difference 
between a person and a thing, between human and natural science. The reduc­
tion of all to this physical state is simply a clear cut implication of science, 
no criticism of other views is attempted, they are merely brushed aside in 
the process. 
The existential view of the problem of being 
Quentin Lauer (43) in his work on Phenomenology stated that the problem 
of reconciling reality and thought about reality is as old as thought itself. 
This appears quite true in noting the difference in opinions previously outlined. 
The problem is complicated by the fact that we cannot know consciousness 
independent of reality; we meet consciousness only as consciousness of 
something and reality only as reality of which we are conscious. The average 
individual will for the most part not be concerned with these problems, however 
some philosophers are greatly concerned with this mystery of being. Although 
we note the many approaches to this problem and although the explanations 
may be limited in number there is no indication that the matter has been solved. 
Thinkers will continue to propose new ideas in their attempt to arrive at 
acceptable solutions and of course the existential solution must be reckoned 
as one that has attempted to resolve the disparity. 
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Several writers on the existential philosophy have considered Heidegger 
the developer of the new ontology, and that Marcel proposed a mystery of 
being ; yet we should perhaps go even back farther for a foundation of this 
concept, (7) 
In his work. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard, forcefully 
taking Hegel's concept to task stated, "The systematic idea is the identification 
of subject and object, the unity of thought and being. Existence, on the other 
hand, is their separation. It does not by any means follow that existence is 
thoughtless; but it has brought about, and brings about, a separation between 
subject and object, thought and being." Here it is possible to note a concern 
with the thinking process as well as existence that he has for the individual, 
the existing subjectivity which tends to evaporate in the Hegelian idea of pure 
thought or thought in itself. 
In this same work there is a brief outline of the Kierkegaardian doctrine 
of the three spheres of existence - the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. 
This could be noted rather as a theory of personality growth than as a meta­
physical scaffolding, as Collins notes in his study of the existentialists. (17) 
Man is the one being endowed with conscious freedom and hence with the 
possibilities of or existing at various levels of adequacy. 
Heinemann (30) finds in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript a 
synthesis of these ideas, and he lists several points of importance and of 
interest in considering knowledge and existence when considering the Kierke­
gaardian influence on the question of being. These notions are briefly as 
65 
follows: 
1. All essential knowledge concerns existence, or only such knowledge 
which has essential relationship to existence is essential 
knowledge. 
2. All knowledge which does not relate itself to existence in the 
reflection of inwardness, is essentially viewed contingent and 
inessential knowledge; its degree and scope is indifferent. 
3. The essential truth is subjective or internal, or truth is subjectivity. 
This summary implies a complete re-evaluation of human knowledge. 
Kierkegaard wants to discard the superfluity of knowledge, in order that we may 
again learn what it means to live as a human being. He discards the old 
distinction between truths of fact, both of them are of little avail to him because 
they neglect what is essential to him, true existence, 
Heidegger does follow in this system of reasoning; in his Metaphysics 
he states that "thinking sets itself off against being in such a way that being 
is placed before it and consequently it stands opposed to it as an object... 
So it comes about that thinking is not merely the contrary member of some new 
distinction but the foundation and fulcrum on the basis of which the opposite 
is determined, so much so that being takes its entire kiterpretation from thinking." 
(29) From this statement there does appear to be considerable similarity with 
the basic ideas of Kierkegaard, and that, in this relationship, the statement 
of Hook (32) that Heidegger is the "font of almost all existential thinking today" 
would have limited validity. 
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With this brief statement as to the foundations of the existential thread 
that may be noted in the philosophy of Heidegger, it would be appropriate to 
consider his position on the philosophy of being and note some of its salient 
chara cteri sties. 
The first thing to note in the work of this author is his insistence that 
he was perpetuating the method of phenomenology as one which permits the 
investigator to get to the things themselves. We would expect such a concept 
when we look to his training. As a disciple of Husserl it would be expected 
that Heidegger would be influenced by the philosophy of phenomenology. But 
whereas phenomenology is concerned with the essential being, that is "the 
universal, the general qualities which are capable of being inherent or ingredient 
in particular things or events. " (43) Heidegger enlarged this scope and raised 
the question of reality and nonreality so as to look at Being itself and did not 
limit himself to the appearing and nonappearing of evidence. 
One must next note in his writings a vocabulary that is specific in its 
own interpretation, but somewhat complex to render exactly in another language. 
This problem was clearly delineated by Ralph Manheim in his translation of 
Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics! The terms sein. Seiende and Da sein, 
although translated by the words being, existent and existence respectively, 
are only approximations of the full meanings implied. For the purpose of this 
paper, however, and in discussing this man's position the accepted english 
equivalents will be used. 
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When we look at man in the world among other things, we see that this 
" standing-in" or existence is not what characterizes the human relationship 
to things and other people. It is rather authentic or inauthentic method by 
which he relates himself to the whole structure of what he really is. "The 
authentic act of standing-in is an act of existence involving a self extension 
toward what is unknown and is not yet, so that meaning may be brought to 
be and new explanation offered for the things that are. The Da sein (existence) 
as understanding projects from out its possibilities." (42) Although the 
authentic mode of existence is basic, the inauthentic has a fundamental 
relation to the description of Da sein; these are as much positive and concrete 
realities as are the authentic, and they both constitute the finitude of Da sein. 
It is this finitude that man is thrown against in his everyday world and this 
is dominated by concern for the requirements of survival. It belongs to 
the nature of a person to exist in the execution of intentional acts. Molina 
suggests that there might be a similarity to the philosophic contributions 
of John Dewey that man is not a creature apart but that he is, on the contrary, 
inextricably and essentially a participant in the world. " (52) The concept 
of existence as a standing out from oneself , the choice of being-in-the-world 
as the main structure of the person, the emphasis on the inauthenticity of 
our everyday absorption in familiar things, and even the choice of the word 
"concern" as designating a definition of the person, all are factors that are 
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indicative of the strong existential flavor in the concept of "being" proposed 
by Heidegger. Like Kierkegaard, his treatment is not so much in terms of 
created being as in terms of the basic free orientation of human life. It 
might be more correct to say that he presents an ontological ethic, This is 
perhaps seen in his practical restriction of existence to man. Da sein is 
man's self-presence or essence in the sense that he is most truly man when 
he relates his essential thought to the openness of being, recognizing his 
own contingency and that of the world in respect to participating in being. 
His essence is the realization of the truth of the proximity of being, and his 
care is a solicitude to realize this essence and in this way to become truly 
human. Existence leaps into being by engaging in a pure finding of being, a 
finding which is always possible and always necessary. 
Unlike Heidegger, the French existentialist Marcel does not look at 
the task of metaphysics as that of making a primary affirmation of being. 
The recognition of being is rather the act of the individual man precisely as 
a human being. This is a premetaphysical apprehension since it does in a 
sense come within the ability of every man and is not contingent upon 
learning some special technique. 
Man, alone among all beings, is not simply identical with his own 
life and factual reality, he is both a thing and more than a thing, for he can 
undertake an evaluation of his own life. "He is himself an affirmation of being. 
He is made by the affirmation of being within him and as himself. Being affirms 
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itself in him, so that he may be able to reaffirm it or give it intellectual expres­
sion." (17) In his discussion Marcel distinguishes between what he calls 
"mystery" and "problem, " In the latter, the mind passes from one problem 
to another without attempting to plumb the ontological depth of a situation 
which may reveal more than meets the eye. "Mystery" by contrast is depth, 
involvement and relationship between the subject of the inquiry and his field. 
The quest is endless and resistant to neat conclusions; such states as grief, 
love, fate, and fidelity are illustrative of those situational experiences which 
properly belong in the broader area of being. Because being is always infinitely 
more than we can say about it within any arbitrary frame of reference, it is 
the interminable quest of mystery. In "problem" we have the first reflection, 
the "me" "it" confrontation, by the reflective posture of communion and 
participation the problem of being becomes the mystery of being. 
Marcel places one other notable emphasis in his philosophy and it is 
the role of the body. This does not to classify him as a sensualist, but 
rather emphasises his notion of the affinity of the senses for other existents, 
and in this manner man is able to participate in the world by receiving, 
sharing and giving. The human existent is thus prepared for the encounter 
with being of others. If we compare this last point with the view of Sartre 
which holds that man is a "stark and lonely splinter of humanity," standing 
alone in his uniqueness, we will note the third and the most recent position 
on the problem of being in the existential thought. 
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In Being and Nothingness Sartre presents his theory of the nature of 
reality or doctrine of being. Here he presents a subject matter that is supposedly 
the fundamental and universal human experience, the comprehension of these 
experiences presupposes an insight which comes only from the frank and honest 
analysis of ones motives and behaviors. Reality, as Sartre pictures it, is 
composed ôf objects and subjects, being-in-itself and being-for-itself. The 
category of objects includes the surrounding material as well as any other 
object of consciousness, including the individual self as seen in introspection 
and individual behavior as seen by others. The subject is consciousness 
which is awareness, that which exists is but various instances of subjectivity 
and in each instance of subjectivity we find a process by which being becomes 
aware of itself. 
In his ontology he seems to be looking for a middle road between material­
ism and idealism. He does not decry the fact of the reality of the material 
world, he accepts that objects do exist apart from human experience. He also 
admits, with the idealist, that the nature of the world in which men live is 
determined by the nature of man. But he considers the dualism which makes it 
impossible for the subject, as one kind of being, to know the outside world, 
which is another. His identification of nothingness is perhaps the central role 
of his existentialism, and may be found in his statement from Nausea which 
summarizes this entire doctrine, "Every existing thing is known without reason, 
prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance." There is no meaning in 
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existence except the little that human reality gives it, and the human being is 
a futile mode in the end. Existence and life and death are all meaningless 
and "absurd" in that they cannot be explained or in any way justified. 
This human reality for Sartre, however, means that man is his project, 
this is the key to all his behavior; he is free and can change his life, he is 
a product of his own actions and situation, and he is as others see him. 
For Sartre, freedom and reality are one and the same, his "for-itself" is pure 
freedom coming from no cause, and its reason for existing is its constant 
activity, its constant search for an impossible goal. 
Although there appears to be an excessive emphasis on freedom this 
in no way should be construed as license. We are free, totally and irrevocably, 
but not free to do anything we desire with no concern for consequences. Such 
freedom carries with it responsibility, since we make our world in concert 
with other realities, and the total result of our freedom is a concrete mani­
festation of our wisdom or folly. Looking into this freedom we see that every 
being is alone with no excuse behind him and no justification before him. 
Sartre sees in this a constant anguish, an anguish which is an awareness of 
the constant need for choice and action and a realization that nothing and no 
one can assure us that this is the right choice or the right action. Man makes 
himself by his choices and upon this choice rests his happiness and the 
progress of the other. 
In this choice the past has meaning and significance and distinguishes 
the individual, but only if a choice is made to give it significance by 
accepting the present; by which one's past is made possible. The 
present is the context of freedom and if the choice is not accepted the 
past is divested by changing the present mode or status of existences, 
thus we control the past through control of the present. Through an 
indirect effect, location or surroundings can effect this freedom of choice 
by putting the individual in a position that might dictate a decision, but 
as in the case of the past it is within the power of the individual to control 
this in the present. An example may serve to illustrate this point; if a 
specialist can find work in San Francisco, his living or being in New York 
would be an indirect obstacle to his realization of finding work. He has, 
however, within his area of free choice the ability to decide to move to 
San Francisco and thus remove the obstacle or to remain in New York and 
continue in his unrealized state of employment in this new area. 
One shortcoming that has been noted by several critics of the philo­
sophy of Sartre is its refusal to give ultimate answers to ultimate 
questions that is questions of origin and destiny. To a man such as 
Sartre such problems are absurd since he feels they cannot be explained 
or justified. Things are as they come to be without reason and cease to 
be purely by chance. Although it can be granted that not every aspect 
of reality is equally susceptible of analysis and explanation, it is the 
function of philosophy not to stop its investigation with obvious and 
important phenomena still to be explained. A suggestion other than absurdity 
as an explanation to these questions of origin and destiny might be 
expected, and this failure is considered to be a drawback in the philosophy. 
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that Sartre has proposed. This should not be confused with the position of 
the logical analysts who ruled the realm of metaphysics out of philosophy 
by restricting the scope of philosophy to logic. Sartre is no way restricted 
his coverage, but simply declared the matter "de trop. " 
Between Sartre and Heidegger we can see some similarity particularly their 
acceptance of certain points of emphasis from the philosophy of Husserl. 
Sartre seems to have been impressed by the latter's concept of intentionality 
according to which there is the consciousness of something. In this notion 
there is a close link between man and his world that had been the early notion 
of a subject with pure consciousness. This pure consciousness gave the 
individual an air of detachedness. Heidegger sought to freeze being and 
consciousness and in the attempt consciousness lost some of its central 
position; Sartre, however, realizes that the individual must be before there 
is consciousness. Man actually lives, objects of the world are not mental 
projections, they are "brutally true. " It is through this close correlation of 
man to his world that he is aware of both the object outside of himself and of 
himself. It is this particular point that is the prime difference in the notion of 
being in these two positions, in Heidegger being is arrived at by exploring 
life, to Sartre being is life! And although in his work Marcel seems to have 
greatly stressed the ontological mystery, it is possible to see that he too 
stands squarely in the existential camp with Ms claim that the "I" and 
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"the world" cannot be separated. Central to everything in the human realm 
is the concrete, the existing individual in the here and now. For Marcel only 
the existing individual, as a unique entity, will be able to meet the 
'ontological mystery' instead of 'problems.' 
John Wild (79) challenges the position of the existentialists by holding 
that although they are correct in stating that theories tha^cannot be checked 
by direct evidence provide no data, no discipline, they have applied this method 
only to human existence and have paid little attention to other levels and mani­
festations of being. They offer no philosophy of nature and in the case of 
Sartre, Wild holds, that his philosophy., based on a very narrow base lacks 
discipline and coherence. He admits that brute facts must be given, but 
holds that causes and reasons are also required, the data should be 
explained in this light. Additionally he holds that to misread the data or 
experience is to fall into metaphysical error. This error he notes in their 
dealing with man and especially with human freedom. Yet when Wild compares 
this mode with the classical we note that he says, ".. .the existentialists 
are more rational than their realist; ancestors. We cannot live without a 
decisive insight into the order of the world in which we exist, and an aware­
ness of our own role in establishing this order, and a sharp sense of the 
radical difference between persons who possess this cognitive power, and 
things which have no world of their own but inertly exist without thought of 
self direction." (79) Copieston, in quoting Maritain, gives support of this 
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idea by saying that the only way to escape the dilemma of submerging the 
common good to the egotistical interests of individual or collective, is to 
recognize man as a person and society as a society of persons. (18) 
This appears to be the intent of the existential concept of being, to look at 
the human condition, to see man as the concrete human persons, not an 
abstract epistomological subject, and at the same time as a self-creating 
and self-transcending subject. 
Thus we can see that although this philosophy may have generated 
certain errors in techniques in the traditional sense of philosophic systems, 
and is at variance with the findings and research approaches of these systems, 
it does relate closely to that object which is the prime concern of the 
counseling art. 
The relationship of the problem of being to counseling 
Here it might be well to propose certain basic functions of this counseling 
encounter. Rollo May (50) has shown three that are immediately relevant 
and which are consistent with the generally accepted idea of counseling. First 
among these is to lead.the counselee to an acceptance of responsibility for 
the conduct and outcome of his life. This principle is in complete accord with 
the existentiaMenet that man is the product of his choices; he is, according 
to Sartre, nothing else but what he makes of himself. He must choose, this 
burden of choice is heavy, and again Sartre points out, man is condemned to 
be free. He cannot choose to be free at one time and not another, he does not 
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have freedom from which he can hide at times without consequence. Kierkegaard 
in his work "Either/Or" makes this clear, it is only through choice that 
authentic selfhood is attained since life is a matter of either-or. 
A second function of counseling is to assist the counselee to find his 
real self and to help him have the courage to be this self. This point is most 
clearly shown by Tillich in his Courage To Be. Courage in man is a sign of 
his caring for something enough to decide and to act despite opposition 
considered in terms of its effect on his being, courage is the self affirmation 
of one's being. "Courage as the universal and essential self affirmation of 
one's being is an ontological concept.. .it is the affirmation of ones essential 
nature." (74) The concept is also proposed by Kierkegaard, in his reference 
to Abraham. (37) Abraham did not reason in syllogisms, but m'onumentous 
decision gave his whole life a new dimension. Not that man has now arrived, 
once and for all, at an ultimate goal and so to speak possesses it, on the 
contrary he is immersed in himself in a most exhausting struggle, the struggle 
to be worthy. He has accepted not a doctrine but a new way of life. Ful­
fillment is possible in it, not as experience evoked suddenly and forever, but 
as a dynamic one. 
Existentialism is primarily oriented to man and interested in man. For 
the existentialist man is the obvious point of departure and accordingly its 
entire thought system must begin with him. Man's existence is the central 
fact which must be continually analyzed and observed. In the fact that man 
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exists really and uniquely originates all his interest in the world. It drives 
him to all his endeavors of thought because he realized that in the end his life 
is at stake. It is in the light of these remarks that the second function of 
counseling can be met, and that the very evident compatability of this 
philosophical system to the art of counseling can be seen. 
Rollo May proposes as h£s third function that of assisting the counselee 
to a cheerful acceptance of his social responsibility, to give him courage 
which will release him from the compulsion of his inferiority feeling, and to 
lead him to direct his striving toward socially constructive ends. Such an 
objective, if looked at in the ordinary terms that are attributed to the existential 
thought, i.e. "besorgne" "sorge" "angst" and "de trop," might appear to be 
a ridiculous endeavor, but this has been one of the problems that has plagued 
this philosophy for too long. The terms are improperly taken out of context 
and are given the day to day interpretation of these words without referring 
them to their specific intent. There can be no doubt, from the previous dis­
cussion, that these terms were used in a philosophical sense, that they were 
intended to apply to a metaphysical condition, it was not the intent of these 
writers to impute these to conduct but rather to the human condition in its 
ontological concept. But conduct is not the same as thought. If the notion of 
authenticity that the existentialist holds were followed, it would be the 
true man in action; the real self which Marcel notes in incarnation, communion 
and transcendence, and which Kierkegaard calls to our attention in his three 
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stages of aesthetic, ethical and religious life. 
Again it must be noted that the existential emphasis that Sartre 
placed on "the other" is an equally prominent and necessary part of this 
philosophy. Although he stresses this aspect more than the other writers 
none of these philosophers deny that they make their world along with 
other human realities. The individual human being acts, not in some 
kind of socio-personal vacuum, but rather within the context of a 
concrete situation in which he finds himself involved or engaged. 
It must be allowed that there are many other functions to counseling 
but these three appear to offer an area for initial evaluation and are 
specifically related to this problem of being, these were proposed to 
allow a very brief analysis to see if the philosophy and the art can 
accept one another. This Ipoking at the one area is admittedly inadequate 
and is not considered conclusive; it does, however, indicate that this 
very fundamental concept is mutually acceptable and will be considered 
with the other points in a final summation. 
This brief evaluation in no way is intended to stipulate or 
indicate that other concepts of being, envisaged in different philosophic 
systems, are wrong or would be unacceptable to the counseling 
situation, nor is there any intention to evaluate the concept of being 
proposed by the existentialists with that proposed by the idealists, 
realists or others for the purpose of determining which is valid, in 
which truth may be found! Its purpose has been solely to 
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look at the antecedents of this thinking, to note the thinking itself, as shown 
by its several proponents, and to see how it meets the counseling need. 
Considering the very individual nature of the counseling situation and the 
emphasis on individuality in existentialism as well its emphasis on authenticity 
and involvement, this does seem to indicate that the two notions propose 
mutually acceptable positions. These positions might be summarized in Paul 
Tillich's words, "Man becomes truly human only at the moment of decision. " 
The objective of counseling being to assist in the development of the human 
and of existentialism to foster decision, existentialism gives man a way of 
discovering what makes him unique and offers him a means of understanding 
his situation. It shows that even at bay the individual still has the means 
to seek his personal identity and to find happiness even in failure. 
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THE PROBLEM OF SELF IN THE WORLD 
The self has been a matter of concern to the field of psychology and has 
very recognizable ties with the area of counseling. Among the persons of 
whom one forms an impression in a life time there is one that is always of 
peculiar interest, it is the self. This is not, however, the same as the human 
organism, it is the cognitive construction of the organism. This is that self 
that Rogers refers to when he says, "Within myself-from With my own internal 
frame of reference I may 'know' that I love, hate, sense, perceive, comprehend. 
I may believe or disbelieve, enjoy or dislike, be interested in or loved by." 
(63) It is this same self that Ma slow posits in his work Toward a Psychology 
of Being, of this self he makes certain assumptions: 
1. We have, each of us, an essential biological based inner 
nature, which is to some degree natural, intrinsic, given, 
and, in a certain limited sense, unchangeable, or at least, 
unchanging. 
2. Each person's inner nature is in part unique to himself and 
in part species wide, 
3. The inner nature, as much as we know it, seems to be 
either neutral or intrinsically good. 
The other assumption made by this author in this summary will not be 
considered here because they are not immediately of importance in this 
particular discussion; Ma slow directs his further consideration to the conflict 
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that takes place within the individual and it would not be of immediate or 
direct value, but it should be recognized to preclude any claim of bias in this 
discussion of self, from the particular emphasis of his work as cited. 
The object of this paper is not to look at the psychological aspect of 
any one notion, although it cannot be denied that there would be some relevance, 
but to endeavor to note the underlying philosophical ideas in each problem. 
Although it is true that these two subjects, philosophy and psychology, can 
only be separated with difficulty, it would be more correct in this work to 
remain as close to the original intention as possible by looking only at the 
philosophical implications. 
The ultimate questions that man asks about "self" are partly answered 
by the very fact that they are asked. The answer to the questions asked may 
be that man is the measure of all things; it may be that he is sufficient unto 
himself; it may also be that he is not a god overlooking the rest of nature or 
even his own particular environment in time and space, but that he is rather 
a finite and dependent creature aware of his own insufficiency and looking 
for something greater than himself. Whatever question he asks, and whatever 
answer is forthcoming seems always to show up the dicothomies of mans 
greatness or his smallness, his strength or his weakness, his knowledge or 
his ignorance. 
Traditional philosophic considerations 
The problem of the self can be considered as starting from the philosophical 
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consideration of man and his place in the universe. The attitudes toward man's 
place have varied through the centuries and this variance has had a direct 
relation to the concept of the self. The first notion we encounter is the exalted 
one, that man is just a little lower than God. Such a notion flows through the 
Judaic-Christian theology but in the same flow of thought we encounter the very 
pessimistic notion that man like all the rest of creation is nothing but dust and 
will return like all else to dust. "Pulverum est et in pulverum reduxisti. " This 
is the reasoned approach from the biblical implication that man will earn his 
bread in the sweat of his brow! 
This twofold notion has been recorded for us in the bible, but the other 
peoples of the world also looked to this problem, and we note among the Greeks 
an evaluation of man. To the atomists he was the same as all the other forces 
of nature with a superabundance of the "soul atoms;" to the sophists man was, 
however, the measure of all things. He was no longer tied to the universe, 
subject to its inevitable laws, but rather free of the forces that govern the 
universe, able to determine his own fate and able to mold the universe in those 
aspects that were of importance to him, in such a way that his desires would 
be satisfied. He was in this philosophy torn loose from the forces of nature 
and made master of his own fate. Plato merely reoriented the emphasis in this 
instance, and although he admitted that man was the master of his own fate, he 
held that this evolved from his mastery of thought, his ability to apprehend 
the universe, the idea. This idea was the pure changeless eternal universal 
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that man can know. But man alone is the only creation that can know this 
idea and the process by which things of nature come into being. In this 
manner Plato stressed man's unique place in the universe. By the entry of 
the divine reason into man's body he is capable of knowing the "real" things 
of the universe. Aristotle distinguished in man, matter and form, but dis­
tinguished him further from all other forms of life by his ability to reason. 
Like all other forms he performs the vital functions, and has the power to 
imagine, remember, experience;pain, pleasure, desire and the like, but 
further, unlike plants or animals, he has the power to think. His reason is 
creative, he has the spark of the divine! 
Now although most Greek philosophers saw man as something living 
in his environment we note that the earlier thinkers saw it as social encounter. 
With the later group the idea that man is above nature begins to develop, he 
is also able to approach the divine because he is of the divine; he has within 
him that which rises above matter and approaches that which is the most ideal 
in the universe. 
Little change occurred in this notion through the ages except for the 
greater emphasis on God as the creator, and man as the combination of matter 
and spirit, dragged down by the body (matter) and seeking redemption for the 
inherited sin. In the process of change through the renaissance, with its 
humanism, to the period of enlightenment with its empiricism, there was a 
gradual withdrawal from the notion of the total power of God in the universe, 
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and with it came a new notion of man's position in the universe. 
Man assumes the central emphasis in Bacon's philosophy where we 
note the greater stress on the value of understanding the universe but we 
must also note that he could not accept it completely as a source of knowledge. 
In this movement we see the first steps away from religion and a greater 
emphasis on the scientific approach to the self in the world. 
It is right to note here the influence of Descartes because it is the 
initial major breech with the scholastic concept and it is also the start of 
modern philosophy. Descartes held that everything in nature must be 
explained mechanically and reason or intellect is the very essence of the soul 
itself. There is one absolute substance but there are two relative substances, 
mind and matter. Although these latter two are united in man, they do not 
influence each other, the body, or matter, operates mechanically but the mind 
is spiritual. Thus man partakes of the two relative substances of which the 
universe is made, therefore man is the universe. His body functions according 
to those laws which operate in nature, but his mind is distinct from his body 
and, as a re suit-is eliminated from the natural procedures. 
For Locke man is a part of the world and is sensitive to the world about 
him. His ideas of the world about him come through the sense organs and 
through experience, yet there is an interaction between the mind and the body 
of which man is composed. In this philosophy, man's reason is established 
as the ultimate test of everything in the world and thus all must be reasonable. 
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and must .satisfy man's mind. Reason becomes the test of revelation, and 
with this philosophy and the individuals who adhered to it, Christianity 
became a rational religion and lost its mystery. The court of last appeal is 
the human reason and an understanding of something is necessary before 
man can accept it. 
As a transition we see Berkeley bringing this idea to a further point 
by eliminating the material universe and making man the central part of 
everything in the universe. Existence is that which is perceived through ideas 
and nothing has existence outside of the mind. Hume carried this idea to 
its logical conclusion by making man the center and whole of the universe. 
Since all we can know are our ideas the only thing we can prove is the 
succession of our ideas. Regardless of what we believe, whether it be 
the world outside of us, or the existence of God we cannot in any way prove 
it by any rational method. 
In this group of philosophers we see the insistence that man must first 
stop and examine the power of the human mind. This examination was carried 
further by Berkeley and Hume; the latter left man standing alone without the 
traditional ability to prove that there was a universe, à cause for his ideas 
or even that he be existed. 
It fell to the lot of Kant to endeavor to limit the scepticism of Hume > 
on one hand, the dogmatism of the scholastics on the other; he tried also to 
refute materialism, atheism, and fatalism as well. Man is a part of the 
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universe of objects and things^ but although he can be certain of the existence 
of the world apart from himself he cannot know it. And this smacks of Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume, with whom knowledge is confined to ideas. But man 
is also able to reason. He can form ideas of God, fireedom and immortality. 
Therefore, while Kant says that man is limited to his own ideas, these 
represent only part of the picture. He can, using the talents within, justify 
his assuming the existence all of nature and the transcedent, and can under­
stand the universe and.control it to his destiny. Kant also suggested that 
there was a higher kind of truth than that offered by human intelligence, the 
moral law within us, by which the value of the world was guaranteed. In 
this philosophy Kant and his followers gave man assurance of his power and 
dignity in the universe. 
In his work, Fichte states that man is a free agent, not a mere link 
in a predetermined chain of material events. His self determining activity is 
his supreme characteristic. His argument to prove this contention was some­
what similar to the method used by Kant; he stated that although reason cannot 
prove the primacy of freedom, we must accept it because only by doing so is 
it possible to realize the demands of our moral nature, and to give our lives 
value and meaning. From this position it was a logical step to proceed to 
the fundamental principle of the universe which he called the absolute ego. 
This is universal active reason which is above all things and is similarly in 
every individual. Man is seen as a part of the universal ego, partaking of the 
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nature of the universe but dominated by this universal process. This 
representation of the idealist position, from the stand point of looking at the 
universe from the point of view of man, was the method used by Hegel. In 
man, Hegel found certain logical processes in operation. The human mind 
moves from the statement of fact to its opposite. From this proposal of thesis 
and antithesis results the final proposition or synthesis. As with the human 
mind, so too with the universal mind, except in the scale of operations. 
Since man is the pattern of which the universe is the complete realization, 
the man is the little universe which is the miniature of the whole universe. 
Thus it makes no difference at which place we start to study the individual, 
since the similarity exists in either direction. 
In the idealist tradition, these last two, Fichte and Hegel, could be 
regarded as different. The older traditionalists were not interested in the 
universe except as it affected man and his relations with his fellows. They 
began with the study of man and ultimately arrived at a theory of the universe. 
In the case of these two it was essentially this notion, but there was to be 
noted also the limitation that Fichte established, that is freedom, and the 
revers el possibility in the case of Hegel. Yet despite this difference it is 
necessary to see the approach through man and his nature; as man, so the 
universe! 
James and Dewey place man as the center of the universe, but this ego­
centric approach is rooted in man's experience. Reality is pure experience 
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and the universe is constructed on our experience. 
For Tamesf whatever satisfies man is true and, conversely, what 
does not satisfy is false. The term satisfy may cause some confusion at 
this point and a word in explanation is necessary. James in his original 
lectures on progmatism noted the excitement caused by his offering of ideas 
"working successfully" as a sign of truth. This he claimed as not a new 
definition of the nature of truth, but only a new interpretation of what it 
means to say that the truth of our ideas consists in their agreement, as 
falsity means their disagreement, with reality. "To agree in the widest 
sense with reality," James explains in the preface to The Meaning of Truth. 
"can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, 
or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or 
something connected with it better than if we disagreed.. .any idea that 
helps us to deal with either the reality or the fact.. .and adopts our life to the 
reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It 
will be true of that reality. " 
Dewey holds that man is the measure of universe; it is that which he 
experiences. To try to go beyond this to absolute origins is folly since man 
cannot get beyond his experience. Reality, then, is the growing, changing, 
and developing according to the conditions of human experience. Man is 
in the universe, he is a part of the process, a creation of this evolutionary 
development that is seen everywhere. 
Throughout history philosophers have tried to understand the position 
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of man. There have been both religious and scientific approaches at each 
extreme and a myriad of interpretations in between. Religious orientations 
have attempted to show man in a universe that was friendly to him and his 
values. The scientists take the universe as they find it in the laboratory 
or under strict scientific investigation. They find only laws and phenomena that 
can be depended on to act in certain ways, but with no concern for human 
values. Yet the question remains, despite these many interpretations, what 
is man; what is his position in the world; what is this relationship that exists 
between man and the universe; in a word the problem of self in the world! 
The existential emphasis 
A system that has attempted to respond to this specific problem is that 
of the existentialist. These philosophers have laid aside the self consciousness 
of the philosophers from Descartes to Hegel. They refuse to consider this as 
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the main aspect of personality, for them it seems to call for an emphasis 
on freedom, this is as they see it, the chief characteristic of the human 
person. Molina in defining existentialism points to this, ".. .a type of 
philosophizing which endeavors to analyze the basic structures of human 
existence and to call individuals to an awareness of their existence in its 
essential freedom. " (52) 
To look at this problem alone from a single emphasis would be 
limiting the full impact of this idea. Existentialism, in looking at man, 
considers many facets of this problem, these aspects can be looked at as 
general considerations and then as specifics. They can then be related to 
the counseling problems that are relevant to the self in the world and as 
developing from the notions of personality and of values. 
Looking at the general area first, of the self in the world, we see 
that the most generally accepted proposition of the existentialists is that exis­
tence means having one's being as a human individual in the world. Camus 
sees this juxtaposition of a blind, relentless, environment and man given to 
planning, hoping and seeking response from nature, as this relationship, 
this obvious bond. "Sisyphus, proletarian of the Gods, powerless and 
rebellious, knows the whole extent of the wretched condition; it is what he 
thinks of during his descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture 
at the same time crowns his victory." (16) He makes capital out of viewing 
the environment as benevolently disposed to man and of endeavoring to read 
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human purposes into nature. His position is one that maintains that the only 
virtue gives dignity to our tasks, with no illusions about ever attaining 
significant ends. His doctrine of absurdity is in open revolt against "the 
loose and sentimental interpretations" that material things are ordained to 
minister to the needs of man in the world. "All Sisyphus silent joy is 
contained therein. His fate belongs to him. His rock is his thing. Likewise 
the absurd man, when he contemplates his torment, silences all the idols. 
In the universe suddenly restored to its silence, the myriad wondering little 
voices of the world rise up., .they are the necessary reverse and price of 
victory. There is no sun without shadow.. .the absurd man says yes and 
henceforth his effort will be unceasing." (16) 
Brie sa ch discusses this position in a more direct fashion and in a more 
critical than literary vein; "Neither a denial of the reality of the world (idealist 
position) nor the denial of the uniqueness of man (materialist position) nor 
a set of benevolent laws of nature nor Divine Providence can eliminate the 
fundamental fact of the human condition, that no miraculous harmony exists 
in the world and that to resolve the enormous tension between man and his 
world is beyond human power. What becomes audible in this tension is the 
echo of man's questions,reflected from "somewhere," and human life at its 
best is this sounding of the depths. The tension also is the challenge to 
proceed with this,sounding all life long. The existentialist considers it 
his merit to have rediscovered this tension in all its sereiïity. He did not. 
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however, create it in his philosophy, as some critics would have us believe. 
Both the personal character of man's world and his being a stranger.in it 
everyone can discover for himself in his own life." (14) 
Once again it will be well to return to the acknowledged starting point 
in the existential system of thinking, and in Kierkegaard's writings to notice 
the emphasis that he brings to this notion. He points out in his Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript that if one goes to history for one's life without having 
first life of one's own, one has nothing to go by, no means of discriminating 
between the authentic and the unauthentic. This would be to abdicate the 
responsibility of living and to resort to helpless imitation. "Every human 
being must be assumed in essential possession of what essentially belongs 
to being a man. The task of the subjective thinker is to transform himself into 
an instrument that clearly and definitely expresses in existence whatever is 
essentially human. " (35) 
Although it can be seen that Kierkegaard lacked an historical interest, 
and had little care for an analysis of the social situation, he was saved from 
reducing his works to a diatribe or a polemic on the human condition by a 
firm anchorage in the religious and philosophic conception of the human 
situation. This, in conjunction with a declaration that it was the permanent 
function of the individual to save and to realize the distinctly, human, was the 
starting point for the later existentialists in a mass society. The self, in 
Kierkegaard's situation, once having achieved authentic selfhood, in absolute 
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choice, has given itself away absolutely. "His absolute subjectivity becomes 
absolute objectivity in his total displacement before God, which is the effect 
of his persistence in a reiterated absolute choice of the infinite." (10) 
It is possible, to note that between Camus and Sartre there is a similar 
undercurrent of theological ressentiment, Sartre's position of "Man-in-the-
world" is on a surer footing in that he employs the notion of intentionality. 
The intentional character of thought means that our ideas are about something 
other than our ideas themselves. This is a phenomenological method of 
explaining the common sense conviction that we work out our lives in the world, 
and it provides the background for the existential description of the worldly 
context of the human condition, the human existence. Sartre holds that man's 
consciousness is the projective source whence proceeds the meanings which 
are related as a world order. This world as an organized whole or rational 
purposes and relations in a human product. 
A description of Sartre's theory of human reality in terms of the operations 
of the prereflective consciousness as a self transcending movement toward 
freely chosen goals indicates the nature of man as subjectivity. But human 
reality is in society as it is in the world, it is neither nature nor state, but 
makes itself. As well as examining man as subjectivity, therefore, we must 
look at man in society in order to really see man as Sartre sees him. 
Man is a society because he finds himself among other subjects and he 
is in the world because he is surrounded by other objects. In this last 
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connotation we must recall that human consciousness is without content other 
than that derived from its awareness of objects that surround it, and that the 
goal of this consciousness is a relationship with and in this world. Human 
reality, therefore, can only be "being-in-the-world" and to define it other 
than as a "situation" would be incomplete. Yet as Sartre sees the "situation" 
the strict limitation restricted to objective forces is not the total picture. 
The situation must be seen as a synthesis of himself as well as the non-
subjective conditions in which he finds himself. It is very easy in this context 
to see the archetype implication of Jung and the environmental considerations 
of the Adlerian psychology. To Sartre no view is complete that refers to the 
self as all contained nor that places the goal of human striving as an inner state 
of grace. 
Man is in society and part of his environment is made up by other people. 
Although these "others" may appear to us as simple object-nature s upon whom 
we pass judgments which derive from our projects, they do in their turn 
constitute us as objects, since they are free subjects and are in this manner 
responsible for our "being-for-others. " Thus the individual is social, he must 
fit into the collectivity, but in the sense that his reality, as an individual, 
is mediated through the other members of the collectivity. Marcel refers to 
this in his Mystery of Being when he held that the thinking of the involved self 
is threatened by the interest in abstractions and by beauraucratic society 
which reduces individuals to the average. To know others existentially is to 
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encounter them, not as things, but in acknowledgment of them as persons. 
Thus in summary of the Sartrean stand, it can be noted that of his theory of 
human reality, man is his project, this.is the key to his behavior; he is free 
and can change his life; he is the product of his own actions and situations, 
and he is as others see him. 
Although it was noted that there could be seen certain similarities in 
the ideas of Sartre and certain psychologists in so far as determinism is 
concerned, it must be clearly distinguished that the goals of the individual 
vary and are privately adopted. This is equally true in so far as obligatory 
social goals are concerned. Although certain sociologists hold that goals 
are of social origin and are the basis for social unity, the existentialists, of 
the Sartrean school, would agree that these goals are formulated in terms of 
particular social environment, and while they involve the modification of the 
environment they also presuppose it. Heidegger's formula that man is a product 
of his past moving to the future through the present gives support to this 
position. 
Jaspers notes, in advancing his personalist foundation of human society, 
that the individual, in treating "the other" as an existent or a self, not only 
contributes to social reality but also perfects himself as an individual. (10) 
The other is the mirror of one's self, learning how to act properly toward "the 
other" is a lesson in self knowledge. The individual does not attain this 
mature growth of dealing, with others and of self possession until he has 
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developed his capacities for social intercourse. As long as the subject-object 
relationship is in existence in man's social state, it is impossible for the 
individual to exercise that freedom which will permit the realization of the 
full potentialities of the authentic existing self. Martin Buber argued in this 
direction when he held that the "Thou" stands as a judge over the "It^" but as 
a judge with the form and creative power for the transformation of the "It. " 
Each encountered "Thou" reveals the nature of reality. (15) 
Personal existence is coexistent not with things but with fellow men. 
All beings make some sort of response to the individual existent concerned 
about them. Thus the "we" form of being can be developed only between 
individuals who respect each other as free objects. This aspect is readily 
accepted by the existentialists and for them mutual relation among selves is 
necessary for the perfection of human existence. Other existents cannot be 
approached as utensils but only as free agents. Although there may exist 
some difference in concept as the specific method in which this relationship 
occurs and is developed, it is recognized that the stewardship of self is not 
the exclusive province of concern of any one existent individual, but is rather 
shared by him along with others. 
In summary of this existential position one might take cognizance of 
these words of Berdyaev: "Man finds himself in the world, or is cast out into 
it, and he stands before the world as before a riddle to be solved. Man's 
existence depends on the world and he perishes in the world from the effect of 
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the world upon him. The world nourishes man and destroys him. The milieu 
into which he has been mysteriously thrust from somewhere else, constantly 
threatens man and arouses him to struggle. And man sets for himself the 
extraordinarily daring task of knowing the world and all that may be glimpsed 
beyond it." (6) 
Existential philosophy represents a European trend away from positivism, 
functionalism, instrumentalism, pragmatism and operationalism, all of which 
tend to be close to the value system of scientist. As such then it stresses 
the importance of the individuals goals and his personal world. 
It is concerned with the meaning structures of each individual's world 
of values, and by stripping out any preconceived notions it would be possible 
to understand the essential nature, the basic kind of being, the basic human 
value, the "being-together-in-the-world" that makes each individual unique 
and important. To arrive at this understanding, however, the values that under­
lie the philosophy must be noted, because it is to be admitted that these 
objectives are not beyond the abilities of the scientific philosophies, if not 
immediately, at least at a future date when the advances of science attain 
their ultimate fulfillment. 
The existential values should be considered first in this consideration, 
for we cannot look at the individual notion of values without first having some 
idea of the grounds upon which these values can be developed. Perhaps a 
paramount consideration in an evaluation of the existential values system is a 
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realization^ first that it recognized frustration, insecurity and striving as the 
inescapable lot of man, and it is only in a life faced with such conditions that 
true values are realized and worthy of human endeavor. Second we must see 
the contempt in which they hold the striving for "happiness" or "well-being." 
Properly understood this is not an untruth nor is it a contradiction, since in the 
first place they may be considered to imply a state of being that is most 
desirable for mankind or may at another time be constructed to mean a state.of 
harmony or calm or detachment from worldly concern. Under either of these 
conditions we have an ambiguity and if nothing else.the existential committment 
to authenticity must deny this possible duality. But lest it be assumed that in 
this interpretation the existentialists denies the possibility of happiness, it ^ 
should be clarified that his is rather a denial of the seeking of happiness as a 
universal. They are not in any way denying that although happiness may be 
attained, it is perhaps generated inea life of frustration, insecurity and painful 
striving. 
The existentialists do not always agree among themselves as to the 
precise nature or the relative ranking of the values that they say should 
accompany the espousal of this life of striving. Sartre stresses freedom of 
choice, Berdysev stresses personal love and creative endeavor, Kierkegaard 
subjectivity and authenticity, but in general we can find freedom of choice, 
individual dignity, personal love and creative love as basic values in their 
thinking. 
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With respect to these values, however, it is necessary to see an 
acceptance of anguish and suffering as a fundamental condition for these 
values to be experienced at all. We can see free choice, then, without 
anguish as being something that is petty or trivial, something without meaning, 
surely something that has little value in determining man's real being. The 
same is true of love without suffering; the essence of love is an attitude of 
care or concern for a being whose death or desertion is always possible and 
which would be an immeasurable loss. Love without this definition is nothing 
more than infatuation or habit. 
When one considers the traditional position of philosophers or the 
experience of man in his everyday confrontation with life, the idea of anguish 
seems to be identified with fear, tedium, anxiety or apathy. But this is not 
the concept in the existentialist system of thought; it is rather to relieve man 
from these forms and to allow him to confront himself with the true anguish 
which is a concern for authenticity, the full realization of being. It is through 
this concern for the authentic self that the individual commits himself to a 
course of action which will involve and engage his total energies. 
The sum of the existential values therefore, has a common source, a 
common function and a single identifying characteristic. The source is the 
acute awareness of the tragedy inherent in thé human condition or as Sartre 
says "in justification before us. " (67) Their common function is to liberate 
us from the fears of everyday life and the tedium of philosophic daydreaming 
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and the single identifying characteristic is intensity, an intensity that can be 
noted in the demand placed by Kierkegaard and the others for authentic self 
determination. 
We must also note that this position has merit only if we accept the 
existential position that the human condition is fundamentally the same for 
all, and also if the validity of intuition as a method of knowledge is accepted. 
If we accept these requirements there is no reason to deny the value 
orientation of the existentialists. But if these requisites are denied then we 
must stipulate others, and this would be a nonacceptance and a rejection of 
this philosophy of existentialism. Yet such a denial would be, in the light of 
the very, humanness of this method of thinking, and the fact that it is a 
synoptic view of man's existence rather than an analysis of the why and 
wherefores of this existence, a flight from the reality that man can recognize 
in his day to day commitment. 
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CRITICAL COMMENTARY AND SUMMARY 
These problems of knowledge of being, and of the self into the world 
show solutions that appear to be at considerable variance. This is not a matter 
that can be denied, but one that must be noted with a degree of concern. To 
propose a synthesis of the ideas is not possible within the structure of these 
many philosophies. Such an approach may have been possible in the traditional 
philosophies, but in this juxtaposition of ideas, an effort to integrate or to 
consolidate the thoughts would be to deny one form of thought or support the 
other. 
Jean Wahl in his work on existentialism provides a concise statement of 
comparison when he states, "Let us construct a few rules of thumb for dis­
tinguishing between existentialists and nonexistentialists; if we say: man is 
in this world, a world limited by death and experienced in anguish, is aware 
of himself as essentially anxious, is burdened by his solitude within the 
horizon of his temporality; then we recognize the accents of Heideggarian 
philosophy. If we say; Man, by opposition to the in-itself is the for-it s elf is 
never at rest and strives in vain toward a union of the in-itself and for-itself, 
then we are speaking in the manner of Sartrean existentialism. If we say, I 
am a thinking thing (Descartes), the real things are ideas (Plato) or the ego 
accompanies all our representatives (Kant), then we are moving in a sphere 
that is no longer that of the philosophy of existence. " Although this quotation 
does not cover the entire realm of philosophic thought it does in a limited way 
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touch on the several fringes and does point to the fact that the differences 
seen in the basic concepts would prove difficult to integrate. 
In preceeding chapters the effort was to look at the many philosophies 
in their specific stress on these problems of knowledge of being and of the self 
in the world. But this overview needs to be pulled together in generalized 
fashion so that the full implications of these views may be noted and from this 
position a relationship to counseling developed. 
A logical connection does exist in the three areas that have been discussed 
and although they are treated as separate studies in the field of philosophy they 
cannot be limited to a vertical analysis. In the broadest of terms, the traditional 
approach to philosophy may be organized in two major groupings: the rationalist 
group that would cover in its span a listing from Plato to Hegel, and the 
empirical movement of the seventeenth century English philosophers to the 
present day Anglo-American positivits and realists. Opposing this traditional 
group is the existential philosophy with its deep strains of irrationalism, 
For the rationalist, reason is paramount, it is the source of all truth, and 
as a result there is firm belief in the autonomy of thought. As a generally 
accepted idea for these philosophers there is the view that thought can, without 
support from supernatural revelation and without an appeal to sense perception, 
discover what is ultimate. They hold to the theory that there are certain innate 
ideas which form the basis of all certainty and from which all proof is derivable 
by logical inference. Opposing this view or this position is that of the 
102 
empiricists who are opposed to all forms of intuitionalism and who hold 
that the mind is originally an absolute blank on which/ as it were, sense 
given impressions are recorded without any action on the part of the mind. 
In this theory there can be no causation, one thing is observed to 
succeed another, but observations cannot assert that it was caused by 
that thing, it is post hoc but not propter hoc. We might summarize these 
two positions in one single sentence: rationalism signifies man's power 
of thought, and empiricism his power of perception and observation. 
Such a generalization is of course almost peremptory but it does 
serve to point out the greatest difference between these two systems as 
well as showing its point of similarity and that is the stress that is placed 
on knowledge. In these traditional approaches to philosophy we note first 
a discussion of the ultimate reality arrived at through natural reasoning 
or a denial of this reality because it is not knowable through empirical 
facts or abstract reasoning. Where then does this place the individual? 
How can these philosophies contribute to his well being? How can they 
provide him with certainty in his daily confrontation with life? More 
specifically how can these be interpreted to serve as a basis for a counseling 
philosophy? If our attempt is to reason from a prior essence of being, or 
to inductively and scientifically arrive at a knowledge of man, then these 
processes would have considerable value. We state, however, that the 
objectives of counseling are to contribute to the client's realistic acceptance 
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of his own motivations/ capabilities and self attitudes, and an achieve­
ment of a reasonable harmony with his environment. It does not immediately 
appear that these objectives can be met in the pursuit of a traditional 
philosophy! 
As an alternative to this rationalist philosophy the existentialists 
propose an irrational solution. They do not claim that we can know this 
or that, nor that man can know nothing but the common condition; they 
claim rather that nothing but the human condition is worth knowing! They 
may deny that a specific object of knowledge exists / or they may even 
deny that the object could be known even if it did exist, but their position 
is not the existence or knowledge of this object but rather, what is its 
human significance. It is therefore first and foremost a system of value ! 
It would be well to note the difference in the way the existentialist 
considers the role of the passions and the intellect. To the rationalist 
the operation of the intellect is obscurred by the passion, but to the 
existentialist the passions are an essential condition to the successful 
operation of the intellect. The existentialists will also hold that his 
insights are an explicit rendering of a state of affairs in which the 
individual is deeply involved and that in a sense he knows what anguish 
reveals to him. Some historical trace of this notion may be seen in Plato's 
doctrine of knowledge =By reminiscence Aùqustine ' s claim that man can 
know the truth only if God first grants him the priviledge of believing 
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without understanding, and also in Pascal's contention that the heart has 
reasons that the mind does not know. 
If we compare their position to that of the empiricist we see that 
the existentialists are more concerned with the "world fact" of the 
subjective personal experience than with the special or abstract fact of 
science. (53) The existentialist is attuned to the real (in his terms) 
world of human life^ of personal relationships, and grappling with the 
problem of finding purpose in life. The world of fact and explanation of 
empiricism is but a highly select portion of the world and is completely 
conditioned by the objective standpoint from which it derives. The human 
world cannot be understood from the objective standpoint but requires 
participation and the willingness to acknowledge the reality of the 
subjectivity of human feelings/ purposes, and aspirations. 
Such an approach would tend to negate the scientific approach to 
the solution of personality problems. These problems arise in the full 
range of human experience, to equate this human experience to a situation 
that can be met head on in the realm of science or empiricism would be to 
reduce the human condition to a mathematical, formula that can be solved 
by predetermined rules and deductions. But such an approach denies the 
individuality of the person, it fails to reckon with the person in his 
particular aspect of life, in his very uniqueness. 
The criticisms raised against an existential approach to counseling 
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have some merit but they seem, to be based on an argument that is not 
singular ; that iS/ they move from philosophy to theology and back again 
to philosophy. If theology is to be the guiding point in counseling then 
it must be admitted that the approach through existentialism is less than 
valid; since it cannot determine a theological approach that is singular 
for itself. In this discussion we are concerned with the relationship 
of the individual to his way of life. Without doubt, ethic s > logic, and 
theology are involved but indirectly since we are first concerned with 
what man is, what he can know and what he can become. The rationalists 
look at the workings of the mind, the empiricists refer man to an objective 
reality, but only the existentialists refer man to himself. Copieston 
states this quite clearly when he says, "The existentialist, it seems to me, 
changes or tries to change the perspective in which we see certain facts 
of which we are already aware. He directs my attention to limits which 
are normally marginal to my consciousness and focuses my gaze on my 
finitude, on my limitations, on my death as the extinction of my possi­
bilities. Instead of my seeing my existence in the world from the point 
of view of a member of "the one" absorbed in my social functions, he 
tries to make me see my existence in the world from the point of view of 
the individual subject who finds himself a pilgrim in the world, who strives 
after the realization of ideas and values and who is from the start menaced 
by death which extinguishes himself and his ideals. The existentialist 
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tries to make me stand back, as it were, from my absorption in "the one," 
from my absorption in my social cares and preoccupations, and to make 
me take stock of my position as an individual. " (18) 
When one looks at the existential philosophy there are many 
discrepancies that may be evident. It does not follow the strict and 
traditionally accepted reasoned approach to wisdom, and it does not 
establish itself as a total system but places great stress on its ontology 
and emphasizes intuition as a base for its epistemology. These are 
positive approaches, its negative side is most evident in its omissions, 
first is its failure to provide a basis for a theology. Yet such men as 
Tillich, Buber, and Barth have developed their theology from the existential 
approach, and Copieston in his concluding statement on existentialism 
says, "In spite of its defects existentialism seems to have been of value 
in drawing attention in a modern context to the human person as a free 
and responsible subject. Atheistic existentialism by its attempt to draw 
the logical consequences from the postulate of atheism, underlines the 
importance of the problem of God.. .The atheistic existentialism of 
Tapers and the reflections of Marcel open up in a fresh way the approach 
to the transcendent. " (18) 
A second area that may be considered to have been slighted is 
that of ethics, when it is considered as the investigation of the right 
end of human action, the nature and foundation of moral distinctions. 
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the grounds of moral obligation, and the sanctions of morality. But 
if we note the plea to live authentically, the stress laid on freedom of 
choice, the stages of life, and the intensity of life, we can see the 
possibility of developing from this an ethic that can serve the engaged 
individual. Wild comments in part on this idea, "the existentialists 
have performed an important service in calling our attention to the direct, 
empirical evidence that human beings are in some sense free, and thus 
reviving the interest in ethics, as a central discipline, which has long 
been on the wane. " (79) 
Despite its shortcomings, the unsystematic manner in which 
this philosophy developed and many misunderstandings about the stated 
principles, we are forced to note its central theme, the individual, the 
person. It is not the person of Aquinas with the rational soul and body, 
nor is it the self-consciousness of Descartes with the spiritual substance 
thinking and enclosing the human person, nor is it again the ultimate 
progress of mind or spirit proposed by Hegel, rather it.is an emphasis 
on freedom. This becomes recognized as the chief characteristic of the 
person, it is the efficient cause of personality or at least a necessary 
condition for it. Personality is something that must be won, it is 
created and maintained with difficulty. If we look at the counseling 
art, we must see that it too is concerned with the person, not the static 
individual but the developing person, the person who is to become the 
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product of his choices. This person is not someone to be manipulated^ 
he is not some unformed clay that is to be molded to fit some preconceived 
patternf he is not an idea or an intellect, he is, as Heidegger claims, 
a person who through resolution, decision or committment moves in time 
from the past through the present, appraises himself, chooses the whole 
of his being, and thereby achieves authentic existence. Arbuckle . 
summarizes these notions in this excerpt, "Thus the counselor does not 
plan or decide for the client, since he honestly does not know what is 
best for him. His function is to help the client decide what is best 
for him, not the counselor, or society, or anyone else, although there 
will very often be a close relationship among all of these." (4) 
In following chapters it will be the purpose to examine the 
counseling process, but to restrict the philosophic approach only to 
that of the existentialists. This effort is considered valid since there 
does not appear to be any contradiction between this philosophy and the 
objectives of counseling as previously outlined. 
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COUNSELING AND PHILOSOPHY 
The objective of this paper has been to show the need to look at 
a philosophy that might be considered in its application to the art of 
counseling. While no attempt has been made to deny the validity of any 
one philosophy to this art, it has been an objective to show that the 
philosophy that stems from existential thought is at least compatible and 
could be considered as a basic approach from which a counseling art 
could develop and upon which a firm base could be established for a 
total counseling procedure. 
In the years of development, counseling has glossed over this 
facet of its system, not only ignoring the existential philosophy but all 
the philosophies as well. Williamson suggested that perhaps its origins 
may have been the cause for this lack of concern for a philosophy. We 
can see its point of origin in problems ! It was first the problem of 
vocational aptitude; it developed from here to an emphasis on the deter­
mination of the individuals abilities through the use of a test and 
measurements, and finally it came to a counseling confrontation with 
multi-faceted approaches, directive, non-directive, trait and factor, 
psychoanalytic, eclectic and others. This emphasis may have precluded 
the development of a philosophy, but the speed with which these methods 
came on the scene, as well as the world conditions stemming from the 
many socio-economic and political upheavals, may also have turned 
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the development of a philosophy. This frequent and rapid change could 
have slowed down or even prevented the development of a philosophy of 
counseling. But no matter, how we rationalize this problem, there seems 
to be a need for a philosophy, because it alone can provide a focus through 
which we can see our roles and activities, and determine if they have 
significance. Through such an examination and evaluation we are better 
able to assess our ideals and aspirations as well as to understand better 
why we accept them, and possibly even whether we ought to accept them! 
To argue and discuss the why's and wherefores of a philosophy 
of counseling without looking in detail at the counseling process would 
be a one sided approach that might lead to decisions that are inconclusive 
or that proceed from assumptions that might or might not have merit. It 
is proper then to determine what we understand as the purpose of coun­
seling. We must again refer to the concept of counseling that is to be 
considered. It is not "vocational guidance," "psychotherapy" or 
"psychoanalysis," but it is an attempt to help the individual realize his 
full potential, in a healthy setting and as a result of his own determination. 
Note here that the objective alone is the area of consideration; techniques, 
approaches, and methodologies are not a part of this problem, although 
it is admitted that the approach to the objective may be influenced in 
some degree by the method that is to be used. One other point that must 
be considered here is that the philosophy followed may, in like manner, be 
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the determinant of the approach and methodology that would be used in 
the counseling art. A recognition of these two points will perforce 
place certain restrictions on this study. This means that it will be 
necessary to look at the general objectives of counseling first, and from 
these it may be possible to further limit the scope of the study by 
referring it to a particular technique or methodology. , 
From these comments it seems proper to outline an approach to 
this question and to consider this in its context and relationship to the 
problem of a philosophy for counseling. The general objective then will 
be to review the major requirements of counseling, second to look at 
the counselee, and next to see the impact of these considerations on the 
counselor. Having established these primary ideas it will be possible 
to look at the counseling situation, the confrontation of the counselee 
and the counselor and to evaluate this specific activity from the stand­
point of a philosophic approach. If the situation and the approach can 
be critically defined, it should be possible to theorize from these 
generalities and to propose certain conditions that would have universal 
applicability to the very concrete problem of counseling. 
Counseling objectives 
A clear delineation of counseling objectives that could be fully 
acceptable may be difficult to establish, but if it is possible to show 
certain characteristics that are generally recognized, this primary step 
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may be possible! It should again be repeated that counseling is not 
advising; in the latter case we endeavor to inform an individual of an 
obligation or a requirement, so as to help in the solution of an immediate 
problem. This procedure is more correctly recognized as direction or 
possibly teaching. Advising makes two basic assumptions that are not 
at all compatible in a counseling situation; one, the individual is incapable 
of self direction, either because of lack of experience, or of an unwilling­
ness to commit himself; and second that the advisor is a person whose 
consumate experience ability and skill permits him to know what is best 
for the client, and that he can impose this decision on the individual. 
We will at a later point refer to this comment, but for now it is proposed 
as a definition or delineation of an advising process. And if counseling 
should not be mistaken for advising, it should also not be taken for 
therapy I In the notion of therapy there are basic overtones of illness, 
the intention is to establish intense and lengthy interactions for the 
purpose of making major changes or alterations in the clients behavior 
or personality. A therapeutic relationship generally implies that there are 
fundamental irregularities in the psychic make-up of the client that must 
be recognized and compensated for if the normal and healthy balance of 
mental life is to be maintained. 
Counseling, however, falls between these two extremes and is 
characterized by a very different set of conditions. The first is that it 
is a social learning interaction between two people. This interaction 
may vary from a very simple information seeking relationship to ai). intense 
long term psychological treatment, but it should be consistently regarded 
as healthy. Related closely to this is the second consideration and this 
is that concern is typically with the normal or usual people rather than those 
who might exhibit abnormal or extreme modes of conduct or adjustment. 
For the client who shows indications that their adjustment to the 
situation is abnormal, the counselor must use his referral service or if 
qualified, enter an intense therapeutic relationship with the client. Such 
action should not be construed as counseling even though it stems from 
the initial, or from the developing situation. A third characteristic of 
the counseling relationship is that it functions to help the client under­
stand and accept what they are and, in the light of this awareness, to 
realize their potential. This realization may come about through an 
alteration or a modification of their attitudes, outlooks, or behavior but 
not through a substitution or sublimation of values or attitudes. Fourthly, 
we should note that although, talking and listening are the primary methods 
used in a counseling situation, this does not preclude the use of tests 
and measurement devices, psychological or sociological instrumenté or 
other materials to help the client understand and recognize his potential. 
Lastly in the counseling situation a greater emphasis is given to the 
positive and the obvious than is given to the negative and the unconscious. 
114 
In these considerations we note the general aspects of counseling 
activity and it should be possible to derive from these the goal or objective 
of counseling. Since counseling is an interpersonal confrontation we 
must question whose goal is to be met, is it that of the counselor or that 
of the client? There is some merit to this questioning because if we 
consider time, experience, society, and needs, the emphasis may vary 
from situation to situation. Under the exigencies noted here there might 
be a basis for relating the goals to the counselor; in this case the 
counselor would have in mind specific objectives that would apply to 
the counselor, and which when adopted by the client would meet the 
personal and societal needs of the individual, as seen by the counselor. 
E. G. Williamson refutes this particular approach when he says, "I 
have suggested that we accept the "teaching" of values as a function 
of the counselor, but that we remain aware of the risk of imposing a set 
of values on a student and thus depriving him of his right to and responsi­
bility for self determination. Rather should we aid him in using rational 
and emotional clarity in facing his problems, so that he may choose from 
among a variety of guides to action those which seem promising to him 
in leading to forward development in him and in his relationships with 
others." (51) 
Yet there are counselors who consider only the limiting aspects 
of time, experience, and needs and determine that these only are deciding 
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factors; these people invariably relate the goal of counseling to themselves. 
By this they dismiss any contradictory position, establish themselves as 
fountain heads of human behavior and ethical standards, and effect little 
more than to bolster their own ego. If the self satisfaction of the 
counselor is the aim of the counseling situation, there can be no question 
that this orientation has merit! 
It would seem, however / that the aim of counseling would not 
necessarily be counselor satisfaction. This may result from the situation, 
but it does not seem to fulfill the total demand of this art. From these 
brief comments it may be assumed that the goals of the client should be 
given first emphasis, in other words the needs of the client come before 
those of the counselor. Counseling can only be justified on the basis 
of its effect on the client, and the only measure of success, or the 
"goodness" of the session must first be found in the effect on the client. 
It is possible that the goals or objectives of the counselor may be met in 
the encounter, the desired character development may come about, the 
standards that the counselor feels are correct may be accepted, yet the 
prime consideration must be that.of the needs of the client. If counseling 
were to be oriented in any other way it could only be a directive and 
disciplinary process, one that would ignore the individual and would cause 
all clients to be fashioned according to the mold that the counselor would 
deem appropriate. The fallacy in such a technique appears obvious if we 
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accept the individual as the prime concern of the counseling situation, 
yet the counselor may negate this individuality by failing to accept 
the value orientation of the client and it would be appropriate to consider 
this aspect as well as that of the personality of the client at this point. 
Consider first the question of human values. One definition of 
basic and general import is that they arise from the relations of men and 
their institutions in society and nature ^  and also that they emerge from 
the attempt of man in society to express his experience and to respond to 
the sensuous aspects of his environment in a particular fashion. The 
question as to whether these are learned or intuitional is of no great 
importance, at this particular phase of the study, but that they do exist 
and are present in an individual is a point of considerable importance in 
the counseling situation. On this point Ma slow has said in his work 
Toward A Psychology of Being, "values are uncovered as well as created 
or constructed, that they are intrinsic in the structure of human nature 
itself, that they are biologically and genetically based, as well as 
culturally developed..." Values are not mere subjective incidents, more 
or less gratuitously superadded to fact, they are inherent in the structure 
of reality; they must therefore be recognized by the counselor and must 
be respected by him. 
The question as to whose values are important again relates us 
back to the question of the objective of counseling, and we must ask whose 
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Values are to be considered? If the values that the counselor holds are 
normative, the choice that the client should have loses its relationship 
to reality, the counseling situation becomes the subjective determination 
of someone other than the one for whom the encounter is aimed. Should 
the values that are established by the community be the criterion that is 
to be the guide, then we are again faced with a problem of rejecting the 
individuality of the client and demanding conformity that may be a 
hindrance to his or her development. A recent comment in this respect 
is worth noting; it is held that before a client can become, he must have 
the right to be. Man moves toward a more adequate functioning only when 
his current behavior is examined and found to be restrictive or inadequate. 
He rejects a certain mode of behavior only after it has been allowed to 
exist and only after it has been perceived as not fulfilling to the self. 
A client is motivated to change because of the emergence of an internal 
stimuli that enables the client to reject an inadequate self in favor of 
an existence that enhances the self. Such a contention in no way denies 
the education process but it would support the claim that the values held 
by the client are the ones that will direct his choice and will bring him 
to reject or accept a behavioral pattern that will permit him to realize the 
self that is the outcome of the values which he holds as important and 
as essential to his self realization. But lest it be assumed that these 
values are a permanent part of one's human condition, it would be appro­
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priate to note with Klausmeier that, "With the individuals increasing age 
and experience some positive and negative attitudes tend to become more 
stable and are incorporated into a more generalized value system or 
philosophy of life. But marked changes still occur during high school 
years and even in college. " (39) It should also be recognized that in 
the counseling process these values, either established or changing, 
will be the basis for the individual's motivation. This concept of 
motivation as a matter of client response to stimulus, external to.himself, 
has been the basis for much counseling practice. Motivation in this 
sense is seen as a process of structuring external events to assist the 
client to arrive at "prior" and "proper" ends. In such a relationship 
the client is viewed as an organism to be made into something. This view 
does not recognize the possibility that the client is or might be internally 
motivated, and in a zeal to develop.this situation there is the danger that 
the counselor might convince the client that he is not "acceptable" as he 
is. But before a client can become he must be, thus it must be the goal 
of counseling to unlock the inner force, the value system that they 
recognize, accept, and need. For the client to move toward a more 
adequate and personally satisfying behavior their attitudinal structure must 
be internally challenged rather than externally imposed. Frpm this it may 
be deduced that it.is to the needs, the values, the demands of the client 
that the counseling situation should be oriented. This is evident in the 
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positions held by the many adherents or proponents of different techniques 
of counseling, each counselor or specialists supports this notion without 
equivocation or reservation; the client is always the focus of the counseling 
situation. Bordin, reviewing the many theories in counseling, at no time -
stressed or pointed to any other consideration, it was always the need 
of the client that was fundamental or basic in the counseling situation. (12) 
What then is the impact of these observations if we consider the 
counselor? Does it imply that the counselor be someone who is simply 
a sounding board, a recording machine that can parrot back to the client 
trite cliches or thoughtless mouthing s that have no meanings and no 
foundation in his own individuality? It does not! It means only that the 
counselor must be acceptant of the values that the client has and that he 
will refrain from imposing on the client those values that he holds and 
that constitute or determine his personal orientation. It means also, as 
Williamson points out, that the counselor must aid the client to clearly 
understand his own personal value system, or as Rogers asserts, to 
develop an I - Thou relationship, a timeless relationship, a living in 
the experience between the client and the counselor. (46) We cannot 
assume that the primary goal of the counselor is to contribute to the 
resolution of the immediate situation presented by the client. There can 
be no doubt that this may be the desired outcome, but one must note that 
it is incumbent on the client to understand the obstacles to personality 
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growth and development that are inherent in the specific situation. This 
should be the action of the client, not the "directed" diagnosis of the 
counselor. Should the client become accustomed to the directive support 
of the counselor the personality and individuality of the client would 
gradually disappear and a "photo copy" of the counselor would begin to 
emerge defeating the objective of self determination. From this it can 
be concluded that the value system of the counselor must not be dominant, 
but it does not imply that it must be obliterated in the presence of that 
of the client. It does mean that it must be used in conjunction with that 
of the client to permit the client to arrive at a point of self realization. 
The terms "self realization" and "self determination" have been used 
here interchangeably, but should not be mistaken in this concept for 
"self actualization. " The self of the client is actual, it is there to be 
refined, modified and to be made into something by the client that will 
conform to his needs. It must become something that it is not at the 
moment, it must transcend its "actualized" structure to meet the needs 
that the counselee conceives as fulfilling his demands. This may be a 
negative or a positive move, but it will be one that is acceptable to the 
client. This is the part that the counselor must recognize; he must first 
be willing to accept the fact that the client has the right to accept or 
reject any behavior pattern, he must be willing also in the encounter to 
respect the individual in his final choice. It is this that is implied in 
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the statement that the counselor must be acceptant of the client's value 
orientation, and also what is implied in saying that the counselor must 
recognize the client for what he is and, that to fully meet the goal of 
counseling, the counselor must be willing to accept the internally 
stimulated attitudinal structure which brings about the behavioral change 
in the client. 
Relationship to philosophy 
These aims of counseling can be summarized at this point, before 
considering the objective from a position in relation to a philosophy, as 
follows; 
1. The interpersonal relationship is with normal and "healthy" 
individuals. 
2. Each person's inner nature is in part unique to himself 
and is in part common to all others. 
3. Each person should be helped to the realization of his self. 
4. The values of the individual are developed in the social 
and individual context of his own existence. 
5. The value system of the counselor is similarly developed 
but must not be imposed on the counselee. 
6. A willingness to accept the client for what he is, as well as 
to permit him the right to self determination, is fundamental 
to a counseling relation. 
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It can be noted that these aims are very similar to the objectives 
outlined by the Committee of Definition of the American Personnel _ 
Guidance Association, There is then some basis or substance in these 
derived aims, and they do conform to established ideas in the field of 
counseling. These aims should be considered in the light of a philosophy 
to see if they can be supported from a fundamental and basic position. 
As a point of departure a comment by Winborn will serve as a 
synthesis of previous ideas as well as basis for this evaluation. He 
states/ "Counselors will continue to be called on to assist individuals 
as they search for individual truth s, examine the value options that are 
available, and consider the responsibilities that are inherent in the 
alternatives that are deliberated. This calls for a commitment to the 
individual and his search for a meaningful existence rather than a 
commitment to any one system of values that transcends the character­
istics of individuals, notions and peoples." (80) Of the philosophies 
examined in the course of this discussion, those that are of the traditional 
nature seem to put little or no:stress on the individual, or they establish 
absolutes which limit this search for individual purpose and meaning. 
The modern philosophies stemming from naturalism, positivism or 
pragmatism similarly seem to ignore the project man, except to stress 
his functionalism. They may recognize individual difference, but do not 
carry this premise far enough. In the existential philosophy we do see. 
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however, a prime concern for the individual, the fully committed individual 
capable of self determination and faced with the awesome need to commit 
himself to his own development. It sees the person as the product of 
his choices, not the result of the elimination or sublimation of drives, 
nor the finished product of manipulation by the "superior" counselor. 
The existentialist insists that one of the deepest elements underlying a 
behavior changes is the freedom of the individual to choose his way of 
life, to make himself what he is, in a word, to live each moment as a 
decisive and committed self. This philosophy notes that in choosing a 
situation that creates anguish, it must be faced decisively and requires 
total self commitment. It also recognizes the relationship of "the other," 
the world about him; the person is known from his phenomenal universe, 
not from his interior and isolated world. He moves in the present as a 
human existence and is involved consciously in "becoming." Van Kamm's 
statement, in his article on counseling, is an excellent summary of the 
application of existential philosophy to the art of counseling in that it 
reviews the philosophy as well as the counseling situation. "The client 
should not be encouraged to escape his present by flight into the past 
where existence is explained by inescapable needs. Nor does it force 
him to revise the fixed history of his past. It invites him to face the 
situation of today, not excuse his self, but to return to his world in a 
new mode of living and to accept its challenges. He reconditions his 
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behavior in the phenomenal universe. When we know the world in which 
a person lives, we know him. Every feeling, desire, hope, and idea of 
the client is embedded in a world of meaning, therefore every experience 
has for him a place somewhere in this system of meaning. When the 
client can grasp this idea of his existential world, he will be able to 
understand the meaning of his problem within this system." 
Considering the several specifics of this evaluation we can see 
that the objective of the counseling art is to work toward a warm human 
relationship in which the counselor fully and completely accepts the 
client as a worthy person. In this relationship of complete acceptance 
the client can grow and develop and come to use the strengths and 
capacities that are his, and to make decisions and choices that will be 
satisfactory to him, and thus to his fellows. Such decisions will be rational 
and logical in that they will bear some relationship to the assets and 
liabilities that are possessed by the individual. (4) Clifford Froelich 
states this objective as follows: "Counseling provides a situation in 
which the individual is stimulated (1) to evaluate himself and his oppor­
tunities; (2) to choose a feasible course of action; (3) to accept 
responsibility for his choice; and (4) to initiate a course of action in line 
with his choice. " (22) 
It can be noted that the philosophy of the existentialists with its 
emphasis on the existent individual, its emphasis on freedom of choice 
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and its demand for commitment are in accord with the ideas of counseling. 
Although other philosophies may support the objective in part, they do 
not supply a universal base on which art of counseling can be developed. 
It is not illogical, therefore, to conclude that the existential philosophy 
is compatible with counseling, and it would appropriate as a foundation 
for this art. 
Conceptual frame of reference 
The existential philosophy is weighed with terminology that is, 
to say the least, frequently interpreted with varying meanings. It is 
as a result of this misunderstanding that some difficulty has been ex­
perienced and may have raised opposition to the system. Although it is 
true that some specificity is lost in translation and some further problems 
arise in the substitution or elimination of these terms, still it does appear 
possible to show the application of this philosophy to a counseling situation 
using that terminology that we find in the common usage of counseling 
today. 
To illustrate this position it is intended to develop a construct 
that will show this relationship, and that can sëEve as a guide to a 
discussion of counseling supported by an existential philosophy and 
couched in the terms of todays counseling techniques. 
The following construct is proposed to aid this effort: 
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^Counselor- Role Expectation^ 
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Before discussing this construct it is well to note a comment by 
Carl Rogers, he says, "The counseling relationship is one in which 
warmth of acceptance and absence of coercion or personal pressure on 
the part of the counselor permits the maximum expression of feelings, 
attitudes, and problems by the counselee. The relationship is a well 
structured one, with limits of time, of dependence, and of agressive 
action which apply particularly to the client, and limits of responsibility 
and of affection which the counselor imposes on himself... " (61) In 
this comment he defines a relationship that can be expected to meet the 
needs of the client in the counseling situation as well as noting the 
attitude of the counselor. Before the encounter however the source of 
the problem should be noted and understood. An individual is in a 
continuing process of developing and he will carry within himself deep 
traces of the past, as well as looking to the future with some concern. 
This situation gives rise to problems that may be generalized under three 
distinct categories; conflict, anxiety, and dependency. Without doubt 
there may be other areas proposed, but these three seem to cover the 
difficulties that beset the person "becoming" a mature individual. In 
127 
considering these as separate situations we find that they will for the 
most part synthesize into one, and that is anxiety. This is not a term 
that is to be construed as just another term of fear. Fear may refer to a 
feeling of being threatened by something particular and may be quite 
unfounded in the eyes of an outside observer. But when we speak of 
"anxiety" we refer to a basic human experience, of it Brie sa ch says, 
"In it the total person suddenly feels the contingency in which he lives. 
In anxiety man confronts nothingness. Anxiety then is not in any way 
similar to fear caused by superstition or a misunderstood context. It 
has its roots in the confrontation with nothingness and offers the way to 
an authentic life, to a finding of one's ground in.. .authentic existence." 
(14) In this comment we can note two very relevant conditions in the 
counseling situation, one the fact that problem of anxiety may be seen 
and accepted by another and two that its resolution will bring the client 
into a contingent situation with his own authenticity. 
Referring to the construct, we can look to the problem and note 
that it is a situation arising from an indecision on the part of the client. 
This indecision will cause him to question his mode of existence and will 
lead him to a counseling situation which as Tolbert claims, in his 
Introduction to Counseling. will, ".. .help him to know himself and his 
present and possible future situations so that he can make use of his 
characteristics and potentialities in a way that is both satisfying to 
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himself and beneficial to society, and further, can learn how to solve 
future problems and meet future needs. " The solution of the problem then 
would appear to be the reason for entering the counseling situation, and 
this relates back to the objective of counseling, not the solution as 
designed by the counselor, but that one that meets the need of the client 
as he sees the need, and is willing to accept; Wrenn refers to this "as 
the self-determined resolution of his problem." 
The relationship that exists between the individual and the 
counselor is one that must next be considered. This is not an alter ego 
status, that is, the counselor does not try to become a part of the client. 
In this relationship he does not take on the values, or attitudes of the 
client, he does not subordinate himself-to the client; he must maintain 
his own personality structure; he must continue to exist as an entity 
whose own existence is his own determination. He must, however, accept 
this client for exactly what he is, not something that he will determine 
him to be in the brief moment of confrontation, but rather the person who 
will, as a result of this counseling situation, determine what he will be 
at each and every moment of the encounter. He will endeavor to help the 
client to marshal his own resources, as well as those of the community, 
so that the client may achieve the maximum adjustment of which he is 
capable. Thus in this phase of the encounter there is a two fold relation­
ship to be noted. On the part of the client there will be a form of 
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dependency which will recognize in the, counselor an "other" who is a 
resource to him in his self-determination.. On the part of the counselor, 
a recognition of this process as well as a fully.acceptant attitude will 
give the client the right to use this resource as he desires. But it goes 
past this for the counselor, who in addition to recognizing the right of 
the client to use him, must also recognize his right to accept or reject 
him in his free choice. Such an attitude is in complete conformity with 
the first principle of existentialism, as seen by Sartre, in which man is 
nothing else but that which he makes himself. But both the client and 
the counselor are faced with this responsibility, to use specious reasons 
to deny this responsibility would be to create a dependency that would 
negate freedom of choice and commitment, or become a condition in 
which the interpersonal relationship, essential to the counseling situation, 
would degenerate into a mechanical and prosaic meeting. 
This relationship is explained by Tillich in his work The Courage 
to Be, of it he says; "A self which hàs become a matter of calculation 
and management has ceased to be,a self. It has become a thing. You 
must participate in a self in order to know what it is. But by participating 
you change it. In an existential knowledge both subject and object are 
changed by the very act of knowing... .But it restricts detachment to 
one element within the embracing act of cognitive participation. You may 
have a precise detached knowledge of another person. . .but in knowing 
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this,you do not know the person, his centered self; his knowledge of 
himself. Only in participating in his self, in performing an existential 
breakthrough into the center of his being will you know him in the center 
of your breakthrough to him. " This is what is meant by the participation 
with the client, it is what the interpersonal relationship implies, the 
participation "with one's own existence in some existence. " (75) This 
relationship may be further defined as empathy. Rollo May defines this 
as "the feeling, or thinking of one personality into another until some 
state of identification is achieved. In this identification real under­
standing between people can take place; without it, in fact, no under­
standing is possible. " (50) 
Rogers in speaking of this condition lays additional stress to it 
by defining its mechanics in a series of questions; "The primary point of 
importance," he says, "is the attitude held by the counselor toward the 
worth and the significance of the individual. How do we look on others? 
Do we see each person as having worth and dignity in his own right? If 
we do hold this point of view at the verbal level, to what extent is it 
operationally evident at the behavioral level ? Do we tend to treat 
individuals as persons of worth, or do we subtly de-evaluate them by our 
attitudes and behavior? Is our philosophy one in which respect for the 
individual is uppermost? Do we respect his capacity and his right to 
self direction, or do we basically believe that his life would be best 
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guided by us? To what extent do we have a need and a desire to dominate 
others? Are we willing for the individual to select and choose his own 
valuesf or our actions guided by the conviction that he would be happiest 
if he permitted us to select for him his values, standards and goals?" (61) 
At the first phase of this construct we can see the very basic and 
fundamental elements of the counseling relationship. The client has been 
brought to it by reason of some problem that has created, for him, a 
block to further self-determination, to continued growth. This problem 
may be real or imagined, but it does constitute a reason for anxiety and 
will hopefully lead the individual to a positive affirmation of the person 
and to positive interpretations of personality. The counselor in his 
relationship with this person has certain obligations or tasks which can 
best be met if his philosophy will permit him to recognize the worth of 
the client. The American Personnel Guidance Association considers the 
following tasks as elemental in the counseling process: 
1. Increasing the accuracy of the individual's selfr-percepts. 
2. Increasing the accuracy of the individual's environmental 
perceptions. 
3. Integrating the individual's self-percepts with environmental 
realities and perceptions. 
4. Presenting relevanf information. 
5,. Improving the individual's ability to make and execute plans. 
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When these are considered in the relationship discussed above, it can 
be seen that they will be met fully by that counselor who realizes that 
his function is to aid the client to realize that the problems he faces 
are a part of life, that they constitute the basis of his choice, and that 
in the choosing, the person actually creates his life; by this commitment 
and in this decisive choice the individual realizes selfhood. The 
relationship does not envisage any subordination of values or attitudes 
on the part of either the client or the counselor, but rather an acceptant 
and empathetic involvement in which both members affirm their own being 
by participation. 
It could be expected that in a discrete reference, the situation 
that develops would be the next point for consideration. But it should be 
noted that this separation can only exist in a rhetorical sense, for there 
can be no time frame, no arbitrary separation by phases in a counseling 
situation. The situation, or that combination of events that is generated 
by the confrontation of the client, the problem and the counselor is then 
a sequential matter to be viewed now, to determine those particular 
aspects that have an impact on this study. From the problem that the 
client brings to the situation must stem anxiety, an anxiety that is 
generated in concern with the right course of action. The choice is for 
the client; his authenticity is challenged by his decision, he must search 
himself, his values, the-influence of his past, and then when all facts 
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are known^ make his choice. To refuse to make this choice can only 
prolong the problem, can only make him, at this moment of indecision, 
an individual who refuses to accept the responsibility of commitment, 
and can continue the period of unauthenticity. 
Yet it is here, in this construct that the role of the counselor 
must be noted. This role is not play acting, it is not an assumed 
character that the counselor will put on to give help to an individual who 
is faced with a conflict. It becomes rather, a demand that the counselor 
enter the situation with the client, that he recognize the particularness 
of the person and that he permit himself to be "used" to develop the 
difficulty in all its implications. Nor is it an advice giving episode ! 
Advice is always superficial; it is a handing down of directions, a one 
way traffic. Counseling operates in a much deeper sphere, and its 
conclusions are always the product of two personalities working together 
on the same level. 
Advice-giving is not an adequate counseling function because it 
violates the autonomy of personality. It must be seen that personality 
must be free and autonomous in all counseling situations, but especially 
in one fashioned after the existential theme, it follows that one person 
cannot justifiably pass ready-made decisions down to another. In the 
situation-role construct however the aspects that must be recognized 
are first, the indecision that may exist with the client and second, the 
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fact that the counselor is a resource on which he may draw. Thus at this 
phase we may note a dependency on the part of the client, an aspect that 
cannot be fostered but which should be recognized. We must also see 
that the counselor will both recognize this need, will meet it and provide 
the client with that help that he will see as necessary to aid in authentic 
self-determination. This self-determination is one that can be seen to 
exist in a two way confrontation, one that the client must observe in his 
effort to come to a decision, and in which the counselor must continually 
recognize in the free choice that the client must be afforded in his search 
for authentic or non-authentic commitment. 
Finally in this construct we must note the difference between the 
need of the client and the expectation of the counselor. The need is 
that which the client sees as stemming from his problem, from his values, 
from his socio economic situation, from his past, in a word from his "self;" 
the expectations of the counselor have no firm roots, they are product of 
the counselors relation with the client and may be based in experience, in 
hopes, in expectations stemming from communication, or from desires. 
But at this point in our construct any parallelism must be forgotten. The 
subjectiveness of the encounter must be the deciding influence. There 
can be no doubt that the counselor will have developed several hypothesis 
to be tested in his mind during the course of the encounter, but he must 
still remain at this phase just what he was at the start, a resource that 
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the client can use, and with whom he can enter an interpersonal relation­
ship which respects and recognizes the "other" as well as the "self". 
This particular aspect of an existential encounter is very appropriately 
commented on by Schrag. "Existentialism/' he says, "is neither 
intellectualiStic nor voluntaristic, neither rationalistic nor irrationalistic. 
It transcends the distinction. The validity of thought is in no wise 
denied. What is denied is that thought can be reduced to a rational 
objectifying, theoretical activity. ...It is precisely the task of the 
existential thinker to think his existence. He must penetrate his concrete 
particularity and existential involvement with thought that has universal 
validity. The existential thinker is a thinker and an existing individual 
at one and the same time." (69) Thus the counselor must recognize 
and realize that the free choice of the client permits him to choose or 
not choose his own form of authenticity. 
The final point in this construct is behavior, this has been 
variously defined, but one that seems to meet with almost full acceptance, 
is that which states that it is the way an organism responds to a stimulus. 
It includes both the overt and the covert, that is, the apparent as well as 
that inner change or response that cannot be readily assessed. Its merit 
is too often judged on its usefulness to the individual or on its acceptability 
to society, and such judgment is made even before its cause is understood. 
But in the counseling situation such a determination cannot be made. If 
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we accept the individual for what he is, worthy of consideration, with 
dignity and integrity in his own right, his choice, freely made must be 
respected, as meeting his demands for authenticity. What then are the 
implications of this particular phase? From the position of the client, 
the choice he makes is the response to the stimulus of the encounter, 
his choice is his own, his decision develops his own life, creates his 
self at the moment. Ignoring the problem does not develop that authen­
ticity he seeks, but only prolongs the period of indecision. For the 
counselor this may be the moment of truth! There may be no question in 
his mind as to the proper course to follow, yet he does not have the right 
to impose this opinion on his client. Not only is such an action out of 
the question, but the further requirement exists that he accept the decision 
of the client first as a right and secondly as that which is essential to 
his own relationship with "the other. " 
Problem considerations 
Two immediate considerations are raised at this point. First, 
what if any distinction exists between this and the non-directive approach 
to counseling, and, secondly, what ethical questions are implied in this 
apparent permissiveness? The answer to the first question is to be found 
only in the underlying philosophy. The entire counseling process, 
regardless of the approach claims that its concern is first with the individual. 
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but in this encounter there is a deeper significance. The existentialist 
is concerned with man, not in so far as he can be treated as an object, 
like any other object, and studied with the aid of the scientific method; 
man can turn himself into an object and consider himself as one kind of 
thing among other types of things which together form what we call the 
world and each of which can be studied from different points of view in 
the impersonal and objective spirit of the sicentist; man may also study 
himself from the standpoint of the biochemist or the anatomist. But 
though he may objectify himself, he is still the subject, a fact which is 
shown by his very capacity to objectify himself. It is man as the subject, 
however, that the existentialist is concerned with in his approach to the 
individual. At no place do we find a positive statement of such a philos­
ophy in any of the other techniques of counseling. Therefore, though we 
note similarities in methodology we must look to the reasons for the 
methodology to note the difference. In the other methods or techniques 
of counseling there is, as was noted, a lack of an underlying philosophy. 
The technique proposed here does not burden itself with technical jargon 
proposed by the exponents of this philosophy, but is apparently supported 
in its basic tenets. "This theory undertakes to explore man as an 
irreducible totality rather than a collection of unrelated behaviors. An 
understanding of the whole man and his relation to society has been and 
remains the necessary foundation of every view as to what is good for 
138 
man as an Individual and as a member of society. " (25) 
, The answer to the second question follows from this consideration 
because as Sartre points out; "If a man once becomes aware that in his 
forlorness he imposed values, he can no longer want but one thing, and 
that is freedom, as the basis for all values. That does not mean that he 
wants it in the abstract, it simply means that the ultimate meaning of the 
acts of honest man is the quest for freedom as such. " (67) Commitment 
has two aspects, one subjective and one objective; the subjective aspect 
is the requirement that one act authentically. It requires that one accept 
responsibility for his past within a given context of a given project. It 
means that once a man has become self conscious he is morally obliged to 
act in no way that will deaden his preoccupation with his integrity. He is 
obliged to impregnate all his actions with some sense of their relevance 
to him, as a man and as a person. (27) 
Objectively, this aspect of commitment is derived from the fact 
that an act is essentially a relation between the actor and the world. 
These problems of actions then include problems of the nature of society 
and history, the relation of means to the ends and the consequences of 
actions . A man cannot become the person he wants to be by merely 
thinking of himself, but only by doing something with himself. This 
requires involving himself in the affairs of others, in adopting himself to 
social pressures, in transforming his environment. (27) 
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Thus the problems seem to pale to insignificance when we under­
stand the existential concept of freedom and feel the responsibility for 
rational decision and commitment. 
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SUMMARY 
This paper has attempted to point out the need to look to a 
philosophy that would be compatible with the counseling art. This need 
was derived from two pertinent considerations, first, the almost apparent 
neglect of this subject and its sparse coverage in the literature, and 
second, the time period over which this neglect has extended. Without 
question individuals have concerned themselves with a counseling 
philosophy but they have not expressed themselves with any degree of 
definite ne s s on this subject. The many other facets of the art have been 
discussed and clearly stated, such as the psychological fundamentals, 
the scientific and the anthropological approaches, and the various factors 
of an educational or sociological nature that have had an impact on this 
art, but unfortunately that area, which this paper assumes to be basic to 
a counseling process, that is the philosophy of counseling, has received 
only a cursory treatment. 
In considering a philosophy of counseling it was seen that many 
systems were evident and an evaluation of these was essential, if any 
one was to be proposed. To make the determination of the compatability 
of the philosophy to the counseling art, a comparison of the traditional 
and modern systems of philosophy was made, using as an evaluation base 
the three fold problems of knowledge, of being, and of self in the world. 
This selection was deemed appropriate because of the very evident appli­
cation these have to the counseling situation and because of their 
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inherent relation to philosophy. From this evaluation certain conclusions 
could be drawn that would permit the philosophies to be related to the 
counseling situation and a statement made as to which philosophy would 
be compatible with counseling. Having made this selection it would be 
possible to construct; around this philosophy ; a system of counseling 
that would be firmly entrenched in à philosophy for this art. The compar­
ison and application was between two distinct approaches, first the 
traditional; which includes certain modern philosophies that would be 
extensions of the empirical approach, and second, the philosophy that 
stems from the existential thought. By considering these philosophies 
in the light of the problems of knowledge, of being, and of self in the 
world, it becomes possible to note their specific emphasis and to see how 
these would support the counseling effort. 
The various philosophies ivere looked at in their historicity to note 
the changing stress that they placed on the problem of knowledge; by 
relating this aspect to the problem of counseling it was noted that its 
subjective and relative value negated to a degree some of the stress that 
was found in the more traditional systems. The rationalists concern for 
knowledge was to be found in the eternal, necessary and universal. The 
empiricist were primarily concerned with that which could be perceived 
through the physical senses. The why of knowledge became for the first 
group a goal, and for the empiricists a means of transforming natural and 
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social environment. To the existentialist, however, the what and the why 
of knowledge are to know the human condition and to provide a proper 
understanding of this condition and existential values. The existential 
approach does not question the possibility of human knowledge nor does 
it place any philosophic limitations on this knowledge, it does, however, 
place it in direct confrontation with human existence. Because of this 
emphasis and its direct relation to the individual in counseling, it was 
felt that the existential philosophy in its treatment of the problem of 
knowledge, was an acceptable approach in counseling. 
The problem of being as a second point for consideration was again 
reviewed from the aspect of history, that is, the concepts held by the many 
philosophers over the ages. These were noted to be grounded in "ideas," 
the idea of "being" was being itself at the onset of this problem, but with 
the progress of thought the notion of substance and the appearance of 
substance gave rise to the question of being and non-being. later con­
cepts were noted to have their origin in the concern that the philosophers 
had for the source and validity of human knowledge. The problem then 
became one of determining the conditions of our knowledge of existence 
and of the identification of the real and ideas with matters of fact and 
the intelligible relations between ideas. An extreme position in the 
approach to this problem was that taken by latter day empiricists who 
reduced all entities to a single level of phenomenal being and all other, 
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views are brushed aside in the process. In opposition to all these 
philosophies, that of the existentialists looked again to the human 
condition. They endeavored to see man as a concrete human person, not 
as an abstract epistomological subject, but rather as a self-creating and 
self-transcending subject. Although the existential philosophy frequently 
loses itself in difficult terminology, and although it does appear to 
generate certain errors in thinking when looked at in the traditional sense 
of philosophic systems, it does relate closely to that object which is the 
first consideration in the counseling situation, the person, real, present 
and existing, not the idea nor the determination of an object of knowledge. 
Existentialism offers the individual the means of discovering what makes 
him unique and also a means of understanding his situation. 
Following from these problems we see next the problem of the self 
in the world. This has been an area of consideration that has plagued 
the philosophers throughout history. They have looked at this condition 
from a religious or from a scientific viewpoint with a myriad of other inter­
pretations between these concepts. The one approach is permissive, the 
other coldly scrutinizing, the one treats values and personality lightly, 
the other ignores them completely. Neither of these or the in between 
approaches are definitive of the position of man and his universe, in a 
word they misinterpret the problem of the self in the world. On the other 
hand we see that the existentialists do not deny any of these positions. 
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They do not deny the idealist nor the materialist stand, they do claim, 
howeverf that there is a tension in the world and that it is man's right 
and need to discover this tension. They see man in society as a part of 
his environment; but still as an individual with values and characteristics 
that make him unique and important in his own right. Such an idea is 
completely in accord with the objectives of counseling which calls for 
acceptance of the individual as a person, worthy in his own right; and 
whose dignity as an individual must be respected. 
In considering these problems in the light of the philosophies 
and in relation to the objectives of counseling it was concluded that the 
philosophy of the existentialists was very adaptable to a counseling 
situation. This philosophy met the needs both of the counselee and the 
counselor in the encounter, and continued to support the situation when 
the encounter was finished. The objections that are often raised about 
the similarity of this method to other techniques showed that this method 
stemmed from a single and completely compatible philosophy. When 
viewed in its full impact it is fully supportive of a moral and ethical 
system that would meet the demands established by an individual's value 
system, and would call for rational and decisive commitment. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
By way of conclusion it can be stated, with some degree of 
certitude, that it is right and proper to base the counseling process in 
an appropriate philosophy. To continue to ignore this aspect of the art 
will only lead it away from its prime objective, the person, the individual 
for whom it is intended; this will preclude the possibility of a warm inter­
personal relationship, and set it firmly in empiricism or scientism. 
Yet if we claim that this step is necessary it also follows that the 
philosophy must be one that is compatible with the art. Those philosophies 
that follow the traditional systems appear to fall short of meeting this 
specific objective in that they do not reach the crux of the problem. They 
stress, so to speak, the "things on the other side of the moon" and pay 
too little attention to the thing which is themselves. The existentialist, 
on the other hand, is concerned with the "existential experience," with 
"existence as a subject of inquiry," with the concept of "becoming" and 
with "subjectivity. " These matters are of very direct concern to the 
counselor and the counselee in their relationship. They bear.directly on 
the decisions that will be made, on the manner in which it is made, and 
on the method in which it is carried out in the continuing act of becoming. 
This philosophy of existentialism then can be seen to support the counseling 
art to a greater degree than do the others with their foundations in the 
more traditional systems. 
146 
To claim that one method is better than the other, and to demand 
that this selected method be imposed as a criterion, would of course 
be contrary to the existential belief, in that it is an imposition of values 
and is a denial of free choice. "The peculiarity of existentialism," as 
Blackham points out, "is that it deals with the separation of man from 
himself.. .The main business of this philosophy is not to answer the 
questions that are raised but to drive home the questions themselves 
until they engage the whole man and are made personal... " (11) Yet to 
ignore this philosophy in making a choice of a philosophy to support 
the counseling art would not be realistic, and if a choice is available, 
it is only logical to choose that method which is most compatible. If 
the propositions of this paper are acceptable, this must be seen to be 
existentialism. 
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